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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
The main text of this thesis is divided into three chapters. The three
papers are contributions to the literature on equilibrium refinements in non-
cooperative game theory. Each chapter can be read independently of the
rest.
Chapter 2 characterizes the class of finite extensive forms for which the
sets of Subgame Perfect and Sequential equilibrium strategy profiles coin-
cide for any possible payoff function. In addition, it identifies the class of
finite extensive forms for which the outcomes induced by these two solu-
tion concepts coincide, and study the implications of our results for perfect
Bayesian equilibrium.
Chapter 3 shows that in games with population uncertainty some perfect
equilibria are in dominated strategies. It is proved that every Poisson game
has at least one perfect equilibrium in undominated strategies.
Chapter 4 shows that the set of probability distributions over networks
induced by Nash equilibria of the network formation game proposed by
Myerson (1991) is finite for a generic assignment of payoffs to networks.
The same result can be extended to several variations of the game found in
the literature.
3

CHAPTER 2
Conditions for Equivalence Between Sequentiality and
Subgame Perfection1
2.1. Introduction
Analysis of backward induction in finite extensive form games provides
useful insights for a wide range of economic problems. The basic idea
of backward induction is that each player uses a best reply to the other
players’ strategies, not only at the initial node of the tree, but also at any
other information set.
To capture this type of rationality Selten (1965) defined the subgame
perfect equilibrium concept. While subgame perfection has some impor-
tant applications, it does not always eliminate irrational behavior at every
information set. In order to solve this problem, Selten (1975) introduced
the more restrictive notion of “trembling-hand” perfection.
Sequential equilibrium, due to Kreps and Wilson (1982), requires that
every player maximizes her expected payoff at every information set, ac-
cording to some consistent beliefs. They showed that “trembling-hand”
perfection implies sequentiality, which in turn implies subgame perfection.
They also proved that for generic payoffs, almost all sequential equilib-
rium strategies are “trembling-hand” perfect, a result that was strengthen
by Blume and Zame (1994) who proved that for a fixed extensive form and
generic payoffs it is the case that the two concepts coincide.
1This chapter is based on Gonzalez Pimienta and Litan (2005).
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Although it is a weaker concept than Selten’s perfection, Kohlberg and
Mertens (1986) note that “sequential equilibrium seems to be the direct
generalization [of backward induction] to games of imperfect information”.
It fulfills all the properties that characterize subgame perfection (backward
induction) in games of perfect information. This is no longer true with
different concepts like perfect or proper equilibrium.2
In this paper we find the maximal set of finite extensive forms (extensive
games without any payoff assignment) for which sequential and subgame
perfect equilibrium yield the same set of equilibrium strategies, for every
possible payoff function (Proposition 2.1). It can be characterized as the set
of extensive forms, such that for any behavior strategy profile every infor-
mation set is reached with positive probability conditional on the smallest
subgame that contains it. Whenever the extensive form does not have this
structure, payoffs can be assigned such that the set of subgame perfect equi-
libria does not coincide with the set of sequential equilibria.
However, it may still happen that the set of equilibrium outcomes of
both concepts coincides for any possible assignment of the payoff function.
Thus, we also identify the maximal set of finite extensive forms for which
subgame perfect and sequential equilibrium always yield the same equilib-
rium outcomes (Proposition 2.2).
In many applications of extensive games with incomplete information,
the so called “perfect Bayesian equilibrium” is used. It places no restrictions
at all on beliefs off the equilibrium path of every subgame. Hence, it implies
subgame perfection and it is implied by sequential equilibrium. We obtain
as corollaries that our equivalence conditions remain true if we substitute
sequential for perfect Bayesian.
2See Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) for details.
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Notice that, unlike related results on equivalence between refinements
of Nash equilibrium, where the object of analysis is the payoff space (e.g.
Kreps and Wilson (1982), Blume and Zame (1994)), we find conditions on
the game form. Our results characterize the information structures where
applying sequential rationality does not make a relevant difference with
respect to subgame perfection. We consider them as tools for economic
modelling. They allow us to know if, for the extensive game under study,
subgame perfect and sequential equilibrium are always equivalent, either in
equilibrium strategies or in equilibrium outcomes.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2.2 we briefly introduce
the main notation and terminology of extensive form games. This closely
follows van Damme (1991). Section 2.3 contains definitions. Results are
formally stated and proved in Section 2.4. In Section 2.5 we give some
examples where our results can be applied.
2.2. Notation and Terminology
The analysis is restricted to finite extensive form games with perfect
recall. Since our characterization is based on the structural properties of
extensive games, we cannot dispose of a complete formal description of
extensive form games. However, and in consideration with those readers
who are already familiar with extensive games, we relegate such a long
discussion to the appendix and only offer in Figure 2.1 a brief list with very
terse explanations of the symbols that we require.
We need the following definitions before moving to the next section.
If x ∈ X , let Pbx denote the probability distribution on Z if the game is
started at x and the players play according to the strategy profile b. Given a
system of beliefs µ, a strategy profile b and an information set u, we define
the probability distribution Pb,µu on Z as Pb,µu = ∑x∈u µ(x)Pbx .
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Notation Terminology Comments
Ξ Extensive form Extensive game without
payoff assignment
T Set of nodes in Ξ Typical elements x,y ∈ T
≤ Precedence relation on T ≤ partially orders T
Ui Player i’s information sets Typical elements u,v,w ∈Ui
Cu Choices available at u Typical elements c,d,e ∈Cu
Z Set of final nodes {z ∈ T : ∄x ∈ T s.t. z < x}
X Set of decision nodes X = T \Z
ri Player i’s payoff function ri : Z → R, r = (r1, . . . ,rn)
Γ n-player extensive game Γ = (Ξ,r)
bi Player i’s behavioral strategy bi ∈ Bi, b = (b1, . . . ,bn)
Pb Probability measure on Z Induced by b
Ri(b) Player i’s expected utility at b ∑z∈Z Pb(z)ri(z)
Z(A) Final nodes coming after A A ⊆ T
Pb(A) Probability of A ⊆ T Pb(Z(A))
Ξy Subform starting at y Subgame without payoff
assignment
Γy Subgame starting at y Γy = (Ξy, rˆ)
µ System of beliefs µ(·)≥ 0, ∑x∈u µ(x) = 1, ∀u
FIGURE 2.1. Notation and terminology of finite extensive
games with perfect recall
These probability distributions allow us to compute expected utilities at
parts of the extensive game other than the initial node, already considered in
Ri(b). Define Rix(b) = ∑z∈Z Pbx(z)ri(z) as player i’s expected payoff at node
x. In a similar fashion, Riu(b) = ∑z∈Z Pb(z|u)ri(z) = ∑x∈uPb(x|u)Rix(b)
is player i’s expected payoff at every information set u such that Pb(u) >
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0. Furthermore, under the system of beliefs µ, Rµiu(b) = ∑z∈Z Pb,µu (z)ri(z)
denotes player i’s expected payoff at the information set u.
2.3. Definitions
We use the substitution notation b\b′i to denote the strategy profile in
which all players play according to b, except player i who plays b′i. The
strategy bi is said to be a best reply against b if it is the case that bi ∈
argmaxb′i∈Bi Ri(b\b′i). If Pb(u) > 0, we say that the strategy bi is a best
reply against b at the information set u ∈Ui if it maximizes Riu(b\b′i) over
the domain where it is well defined.
The strategy bi is a best reply against (b,µ) at the information set u ∈Ui
if bi ∈ argmaxb′i∈Bi R
µ
iu(b\b′i). If bi prescribes a best reply against (b,µ) at
every information set u∈Ui, we say that bi is a sequential best reply against
(b,µ). The strategy profile b is a sequential best reply against (b,µ) if it
prescribes a sequential best reply against (b,µ) for every player.
With this terminology at hand we define several equilibrium concepts.
DEFINITION 2.1 (Nash Equilibrium). A strategy profile b ∈ B is a Nash
equilibrium of Γ if every player is playing a best reply against b.
We denote by NE(Γ) the set of Nash equilibria of Γ. Subgame perfec-
tion refines the Nash equilibrium concept by requiring a Nash equilibrium
in every subgame. Formally,
DEFINITION 2.2 (Subgame Perfect Equilibrium). A strategy profile b
is a subgame perfect equilibrium of Γ if, for every subgame Γy of Γ, the
restriction by constitutes a Nash equilibrium of Γy.
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We denote by SPE(Γ) the set of subgame perfect equilibria of Γ. We
write SPEO(Γ) = {Pb : b∈ SPE(Γ)} for the set of subgame perfect equilib-
rium outcomes, and SPEP(Γ) = {R(b) : b∈ SPE(Γ)} for the set of subgame
perfect equilibrium payoffs, where R(b) = (R1(b), . . . ,Rn(b)).
Sequential rationality is a refinement of subgame perfection. Every
player must maximize at every information set according to her beliefs
about how the game has evolved so far. If b is a completely mixed strat-
egy profile, beliefs are perfectly defined by Bayes’ rule. Otherwise, be-
liefs should meet a consistency requirement. A sequential equilibrium is an
assessment that satisfies such a consistency requirement together with an
optimality requirement. This is formalized by the next two definitions.
DEFINITION 2.3 (Consistent Assessment). An assessment (b,µ) is con-
sistent if there exists a sequence {(bt ,µt)}t , where bt is a completely mixed
strategy profile and µt(x) = Pbt (x|u) for x∈ u, such that lim
t→∞(bt ,µt) = (b,µ).
DEFINITION 2.4 (Sequential Equilibrium). A sequential equilibrium of
Γ is a consistent assessment (b,µ) such that b is a sequential best reply
against (b,µ).
If Γ is an extensive game, we denote by SQE(Γ) the set of strategies
b such that (b,µ) is a sequential equilibrium of Γ, for some µ. Moreover,
SQEO(Γ) = {Pb : b ∈ SQE(Γ)} denotes the set of sequential equilibrium
outcomes and SQEP(Γ) = {R(b) : b ∈ SQE(Γ)} the set of sequential equi-
librium payoffs. Recall that SQE(Γ)⊆ SPE(Γ) for any game Γ.
We now introduce some new definitions that are needed for the results.
DEFINITION 2.5 (Minimal Subform of an Information Set). Given an
information set u, the minimal subform that contains u, to be denoted Ξ(u),
is the subform Ξy that contains u and does not properly include any other
subform that contains u.
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We say that Γy = (Ξy, rˆ) is the minimal subgame that contains u if Ξy is
the minimal subform that contains u.
In a given extensive form there are information sets that are always
reached with positive probability. When this does not happen we say that
the information set is avoidable, formally:
DEFINITION 2.6 (Avoidable information set). An information set u is
avoidable in the extensive form Ξ if Pb(u) = 0, for some b ∈ B. Likewise,
we say that the information set u is avoidable in the subform Ξy if Pby(u)= 0,
for some b ∈ B.
For reasons that will become clear in the next section, we are interested
in identifying extensive games where no information set is avoidable in its
minimal subform. To get an idea about the set of extensive forms that we
have in mind consider Figures 2.2 and 2.3. In the former, no information
set is avoidable in the extensive form. While in the latter, no information
set is avoidable in its minimal subform.
1−ρ0 < ρ < 1
N
2
1
3
FIGURE 2.2. Extensive form where no information set is avoidable.
Conversely, consider Figure 2.4. Player 2’s information set is avoidable
in the extensive form (also in its minimal subform since the entire game is
the only proper subgame) because player 1 can decide not to let her move.
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1
2
1 1 1 1
2 2
FIGURE 2.3. Extensive form where no information set is
avoidable in its minimal subform.
2.4. Results
The three “best reply” concepts introduced in Section 2.3 relate to each
other, as it is shown in the first two statements of the next lemma. The
third assertion of the same lemma shows that maximizing behavior at an
information set is independent of the subgame of reference.
LEMMA 2.1. Fix a game Γ = (Ξ,r). The following assertions hold:
(1) Given a strategy profile b, if u ∈Ui is such that Pb(u) > 0 and bi
is a best reply against b, then bi is a best reply against b at the
information set u.
(2) Given a consistent assessment (b,µ), if u ∈Ui is such that Pb(u)>
0 and bi is a best reply against b at the information set u, then bi
is a best reply against (b,µ) at the information set u.
(3) If Γy is the minimal subgame that contains u and (by,µy) is the
restriction of some assessment (b,µ) to Γy, then bi is a best reply
against (b,µ) at the information set u in the game Γ if and only if
by,i is a best reply against (by,µy) at the information set u in the
game Γy.
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PROOF. Part 1 is known.3 Proofs for 2 and 3 are trivial. 
In the next proposition we identify the set of extensive forms where
sequential equilibrium has no additional bite over subgame perfection. The
latter concept allows for the play of non-credible threats at information sets
that might never be reached conditional on its minimal subgame. However,
if we restrict attention to extensive form games where no information set is
avoidable in its minimal subform, we can use the previous lemma to show
that sequential and subgame perfect equilibrium coincide.
It turns out that not only is this particular restriction sufficient but also
necessary for the equivalence, in the following sense: we can always find a
payoff assignment so that the sets of subgame perfect and sequential equi-
librium differ when the restriction fails to hold. The construction of such
payoff assignment is based on, first, taking one information set that is avoid-
able in its minimal subform out of one subgame perfect equilibrium path
and, second, making one of the available actions at this avoidable informa-
tion set a strictly dominated action. Take for instance the game contained in
Figure 2.4. If player 1 moves Out she gives player 2 the possibility of taking
the strictly dominated move H, which forms a subgame perfect equilibrium
which is not sequential.
PROPOSITION 2.1. Let Ξ be an extensive form such that no information
set u is avoidable in Ξ(u). Then for any possible payoff vector r, the game
Γ = (Ξ,r) is such that SPE(Γ) = SQE(Γ). Conversely, if Ξ is an extensive
form with an information set u that is avoidable in Ξ(u), then we can find a
payoff vector r such that for the game Γ = (Ξ,r), SPE(Γ) 6= SQE(Γ).
3For instance, see van Damme (1991), Theorem 6.2.1.
14 2. SEQUENTIALITY AND SUBGAME PERFECTION
1 Out 1,1
H
0,0
G
1,1
H
0,0
G
1,1
2
FIGURE 2.4. Example of the use of the algorithm contained
in the proof of Proposition 2.1 to generate a game where
SPE(Γ) 6= SQE(Γ).
PROOF. Let us prove the first part of the proposition. We only have to
show that SPE(Γ)⊆ SQE(Γ). Consider b ∈ SPE(Γ) and construct a consis-
tent assessment (b,µ).4 We have to prove that the set
(1) ˜U(b,µ) =
n⋃
i=1
{
u ∈Ui : bi /∈ argmax
˜bi∈Bi
Rµiu(b\˜bi)
}
is empty. Assume to the contrary that ˜U(b,µ) 6= /0, and consider u∈ ˜U(b,µ).
Let Γy be the minimal subgame that contains u and let j be the player mov-
ing at u. By lemma 2.1.3, by, j is not a best reply against (by,µy) at u in
the game Γy. Part 2 implies either that Pby(u) = 0 or that by, j is not a best
reply against by at u. If the latter was true, part 1 would anyway imply that
Pby(u) = 0. However, u is not avoidable in Ξy. This provides the contradic-
tion.
4A general method to define consistent assessments (b,µ) for any given b ∈ B, in an
extensive form, is the following: take a sequence of completely mixed strategy profile
{bt}t → b and for each t, construct µt(x) = Pbt (x|u) ∈ [0,1], ∀x ∈ u, for all information
sets u. Call k = |X \P0|. The set [0,1]k is compact and since µt ∈ [0,1]k,∀t, there exists
a subsequence of {t}, call it {t j}, such that {µt j}t j converges in [0,1]k. Define beliefs as
µ = lim
j→∞
µt j .
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Let us now prove the second part of the proposition. Suppose u ∈Ui is
an information set that is avoidable in Ξ(u) and let c ∈ Cu be an arbitrary
choice available at u. Assign the following payoffs:
(2)

ri(z) = 0 ∀i if z ∈ Z(c)
ri(z) = 1 ∀i elsewhere.
Clearly any strategy bi = bi\c cannot be part of a sequential equilibrium
since playing a different choice at u gives player i strictly higher expected
payoff at that information set.
We now have to show that there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium
b such that bi = bi\c. By assumption there exists b′ such that Pb′y (u) = 0
in the minimal subgame Γy that contains u. The equality Pby(u) = 0 also
holds for b = b′\c. The strategy profile by is a Nash equilibrium of Γy
since nobody can obtain a payoff larger than one. By the same argument, b
induces a Nash equilibrium in every subgame, hence it is a subgame perfect
equilibrium. This completes the proof. 
We use the extensive form of Selten’s horse game (Figures 2.5 and 2.6)
to show that the algorithm (used in the proof of the second part of Proposi-
tion 2.1) does not depend either on the particular avoidable information set,
or on the particular choice that is taken to construct the payoffs. Information
set u in the algorithm corresponds to player 2’s (player 3’s) information set
in Figure 2.5 (Figure 2.6), and choice c ∈Cu in the algorithm corresponds
to choice B (choice R) in Figure 2.5 (Figure 2.6).
Notice that the payoff assignment in the previous proof yields a differ-
ence in equilibrium strategies but not in equilibrium payoffs. The reason is
that we cannot always achieve difference in equilibrium outcomes (there-
fore, neither in equilibrium payoffs). Figure 2.7 contains an extensive form
where the second information set of player 1 is avoidable in its minimal
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1 1,1,1
B
2
3
R
1,1,1
L
1,1,1
R
0,0,0
L
0,0,0
FIGURE 2.5. Selten’s horse. An example of the use of the
algorithm contained in the proof of proposition 2.1 to gener-
ate a game where SPE(Γ) 6= SQE(Γ).
1 1,1,1
B
2
3
R
0,0,0
L
1,1,1
R
0,0,0
L
1,1,1
FIGURE 2.6. Selten’s horse. A different use of the algo-
rithm contained in Proposition 2.1.
subform, and nevertheless, the sets of sequential and subgame perfect equi-
librium outcomes always coincide, regardless of what the payoffs assigned
to final nodes are. Proposition 2.2 provides a sufficient and necessary con-
dition for the sets of equilibrium outcomes (also, of equilibrium payoffs) to
be equal for any conceivable payoff function.
Before that, we need to be able to identify which players can avoid
a given information set. Let u be an information set and let Ξy = Ξ(u).
Construct the set of strategies B(u) =
{
b ∈ B : Pby(u)> 0
}
.
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DEFINITION 2.7. We say that the information set u can be avoided in
Ξ(u) by player i if there exists a strategy profile b ∈ B(u), and a choice
c ∈Cv, with v ∈Ui, such that Pb\cy (u) = 0.
Remember that for an information set u that is avoidable in Ξ(u) = Ξy
there must be a strategy profile b such that Pby = 0 (Definition 2.6). If a
player, say player i, is able to unilaterally modify a strategy profile b′ for
which Pb′y > 0, by changing only one of her choices, and hereby construct
one b for which Pby = 0, then we say that the information set u can be
avoided in Ξ(u) by player i. Therefore, associated with any information
set, there is a (possibly empty) list of players who can avoid it in its mini-
mal subform. Figure 2.7 is an example of an extensive form where for every
information set such a list is either empty or contains only the owner of the
information set. When this happens, sequential equilibrium has no addi-
tional bite over subgame perfection regarding equilibrium outcomes. The
reason is that subgame perfection allows a player to choose actions sub-
optimally, but given the particular structure of the game form, it can only
happen at information sets already avoided by her own previous behavior,
and choices at such information sets do not affect the outcome of the game.
1
2
1
FIGURE 2.7. The second information set of player 1 can
only be avoided by player 1. Proposition 2.2 implies that
SPEP(Γ) = SQEP(Γ).
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This condition is also necessary for equivalence in equilibrium out-
comes in the following sense: if player i can avoid the information set u in
its minimal subform, and if j is the owner of the information set u, there ex-
ists a payoff assignment so that player j can “non-credibly” threaten player
i (something ruled out by sequential equilibrium but not by subgame per-
fection) bringing about the difference in equilibrium outcomes.
The following lemma is useful for the proof of Proposition 2.2.
LEMMA 2.2. Let Ξ be an extensive form such that, whenever an infor-
mation set u is avoidable in Ξ(u), it can only be avoided in Ξ(u) by its
owner. Let (b,µ) and (b′,µ′) be two consistent assessments. If b and b′ are
such that Pby = Pb
′
y for every subform Ξy, then µ = µ′.
PROOF. Let (b,µ) and (b′,µ′) be two consistent assessments such that
Pby = Pb
′
y for every subform Ξy. Note that b′ can be obtained from b by
changing behavior at information sets that are reached with zero probability
within their minimal subform. Hence, without loss of generality, let b and
b′ differ only at one such information set, say u ∈ Ui, and let Ξy = Ξ(u).
The shift from b to b′ may cause a change in beliefs only at information sets
that come after u and are in the same minimal subform Ξy. Let v ∈U j be
one of those information sets.
If j = i, perfect recall and consistency imply that there is no change in
beliefs at the information set v. If j 6= i there are two possible cases, either
Pby(v)> 0 or Pby(v) = 0. In the first case the beliefs at v are uniquely defined,
therefore, µ(x) = µ′(x),∀x ∈ v and moreover, µ(x) = µ′(x) = 0,∀x ∈ v such
that u < x. In the second case, since the information set v can only be
avoided by player j in Ξ(u) there exists a choice c∈Cw of player j such that
Pb\cy (v)> 0, otherwise player i would also be able to avoid the information
set u in Ξ(u). Let b′′ = b\c and b′′′ = b′\c, then by the discussion of the
first case, µ′′(x) = µ′′′(x),∀x∈ v, furthermore, perfect recall and consistency
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imply µ′′(x) = µ(x) and µ′′′(x) = µ′(x),∀x ∈ v, which in turn implies µ(x) =
µ′(x),∀x ∈ v. 
We are now ready to state and prove our second equivalence result.
PROPOSITION 2.2. Let Ξ be an extensive form such that, whenever an
information set u is avoidable in Ξ(u), it can only be avoided in Ξ(u) by its
owner. Then for any possible payoff vector r, the game Γ = (Ξ,r) is such
that SPEO(Γ) = SQEO(Γ). Conversely, if Ξ is an extensive form with an
information set u that can be avoided in Ξ(u) by a different player than its
owner, then we can find a payoff vector r such that for the game Γ = (Ξ,r),
SPEP(Γ) 6= SQEP(Γ).
PROOF. Let us prove the first part of the proposition. We need to prove
that ∀b ∈ SPE(Γ), Pb ∈ SQEO(Γ). Take an arbitrary b ∈ SPE(Γ) and con-
struct some consistent beliefs µ.
If the set ˜U(b,µ) =
n⋃
i=1
{
u ∈Ui : bi /∈ argmax˜bi∈Bi R
µ
iu(b\˜bi)
}
is empty,
then b ∈ SQE(Γ) and Pb ∈ SQEO(Γ). Otherwise, we need to find a sequen-
tial equilibrium (b∗,µ∗) such that Pb∗ = Pb.
Step 1: Take an information set u ∈ ˜U(b,µ). Let i be the player that
moves at this information set, and let Γy = (Ξ(u), rˆ). As in the
proof of proposition 2.1, notice that by Lemma 2.1, u should be
such that Pby(u) = 0, hence it is avoidable in its minimal subform.
By assumption, u can only be avoided by player i.
Step 2: Let b′ be the strategy profile b modified so that player i plays
a best reply against (b,µ) at the information set u. Construct a con-
sistent assessment (b′,µ′). Notice that Pb′ = Pb and, in particular,
Pb′y = Pby . By Lemma 2.2, µ and µ′ assign the same probability
distribution on every information set.
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Step 3: We now prove that b′ ∈ SPE(Γ). For this we need b′y ∈
NE(Γy). Given the strategy profile b′y in the subgame Γy, player
i cannot profitably deviate because this would mean that she was
also able to profitably deviate when by was played in the subgame
Γy, which contradicts by ∈ NE(Γy).
Suppose now that there exists a player j 6= i who has a prof-
itable deviation b′′y, j from b′y, j in the subgame Γy. The hypothesis
on the extensive form Ξ implies P
b\b′′y, j
y = P
b′\b′′y, j
y , which further
implies that b′′y, j should have also been a profitable deviation from
by. However, this is impossible since by ∈ NE(Γy).
Step 4: By step 2, | ˜U(b′,µ′)| = | ˜U(b,µ)|− 1. If | ˜U(b′,µ′)| 6= 0, ap-
ply the same type of transformation to b′. Suppose that the cardi-
nality of ˜U(b,µ) is q, then in the qth transformation we will ob-
tain a consistent assessment (b(q),µ(q)) such that b(q) ∈ SPE(Γ),
Pb = Pb(q) , and ˜U(b(q),µ(q)) = /0. Observe that, b(q) ∈ SPE(Γ) and
˜U(b(q),µ(q)) = /0 imply b(q) ∈ SQE(Γ). Therefore (b(q),µ(q)) is the
sequential equilibrium (b∗,µ∗) we were looking for.
Let us now prove the second part of the proposition. For notational
convenience, it is proved for games without proper subgames, however, the
argument extends immediately to the general case.
Given a node x ∈ T , the set Path(x) = {c ∈⋃uCu : c < x} of choices is
called path to x.
Suppose that u is an information set that can be avoided in Ξ by a player,
say player j, different from the player moving at it, say player i. Note that
there must exist an x ∈ u and a choice c ∈ Cv, where v ∈ U j, such that if
b = b\Path(x), then Pb\c(u) = 0 is true.
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Let f ∈Cu be an arbitrary choice available to player i at u. Assign the
following payoffs:
(3)

r j(z) = 0 if z ∈ Z(c)
ri(z) = r j(z) = 0 if z ∈ Z( f )
ri(z) = r j(z) = 1 if z ∈ Z(u)\Z( f ).
Let d ∈ Path(x) with d 6∈Cv, assign payoffs to the terminal nodes, whenever
allowed by 3, in the following fashion:
(4) rk(z)> rk(z′) where z ∈ Z(d) and z′ ∈ Z(Cw \{d}).
Player k above is the player who has choice d available at the information
set w. Give zero to every player everywhere else.
In words, player j moves with positive probability in the game. She has
two choices, either moving towards the information set u and letting player
i decide, or moving away from the information set u. If she moves away she
gets zero for sure. If she lets player i decide, player i can either make both
get zero by choosing f , or make both get one by choosing something else.
Due to 4, no player will disturb this description of the playing of the game.
This game has a Nash equilibrium in which player i moves f and player
j obtains a payoff equal to zero by moving c. However, in every sequential
equilibrium of this game, player i does not choose f and, as a consequence,
player j takes the action contained in Path(x)∩Cv. Therefore, in every
sequential equilibrium, players i and j obtain a payoff strictly larger than
zero.5 This completes the proof. 
For a very simple application of the previous algorithm, consider the
extensive game of Figure 2.4 and substitute the payoff vector following
move Out of player 1, with the payoff vector (0,0). Again, the first player
5Equilibrium payoffs are not necessarily equal to one due to eventual moves of Nature.
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moving Out and the second player taking the strictly dominated move H,
is a subgame perfect equilibrium that yields an equilibrium payoff vector
equal to (0,0). However, in any sequential equilibrium, player 2 moves G
and player 1 does not move Out, which makes (1,1) the only sequential
equilibrium payoff vector.
REMARK 2.1. Notice that, in the set of extensive forms under study in
the last proposition, beliefs are always uniquely defined for any given strat-
egy profile (consider b′ = b in Lemma 2.2). One may incorrectly think that
it is the uniqueness of the beliefs that is behind the equivalence. Consider a
modification of the game form in Figure 2.7 so that the second information
set of player 1 is controlled by a new player 3. This modified extensive form
has a unique system of consistent beliefs for any given strategy profile but,
as seen in Proposition 2.2, the set of equilibrium outcomes is not the same
for both concepts for every possible payoff vector.
2.4.1. Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. These results can be helpful in
applied work. But many applied economists use Perfect Bayesian Equilib-
rium in extensive games with incomplete information. This motivates us
to analyze the relationship between this concept and our previous findings.
The formal definition that we use is:
DEFINITION 2.8. An assessment (b,µ) is a perfect Bayesian equilib-
rium of the extensive game Γ if it satisfies the following conditions:
(1) For every information set u if Pby(u) > 0, then µ(x) = Pby(x|u),
where Ξy = Ξ(u), for all x ∈ u;
(2) b is a sequential best reply against (b,µ).6
6This is the weakest and the most used version. See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) for
related definitions.
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Let PBE(Γ) be the set of strategies that together with some system of be-
liefs make up a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Let PBEP(Γ) and PBEO(Γ)
be the sets of, respectively, perfect Bayesian equilibrium payoffs and perfect
Bayesian equilibrium outcomes.
A quick inspection of the definition reveals that perfect Bayesian equi-
librium implies subgame perfection and that it is implied by sequential
equilibrium. This observation by itself proves that the sufficiency parts
of Propositions 2.1 and 2.2 hold if we replace SQE(Γ) with PBE(Γ) and
SQEO(Γ) with PBEO(Γ).
As for the necessity part of both propositions, the algorithms proposed
are also valid to construct subgame perfect equilibra (subgame perfect equi-
librium payoffs) that are not perfect Bayesian (perfect Bayesian equilibrium
payoffs). Note that the irrational move prohibited to a player having consis-
tent beliefs is also forbidden to a player that has any conceivable beliefs.
In other words, the conditions for equivalence between subgame per-
fection and perfect Bayesian equilibrium parallel those between subgame
perfection and sequentiality. Formally:
COROLLARY 2.1. If Ξ is an extensive form such that no information set
u can be avoided in Ξ(u), then for any possible payoff vector r, the game
Γ = (Ξ,r) is such that SPE(Γ) = PBE(Γ). If Ξ is an extensive form with
an information set u that can be avoided in Ξ(u), then we can find a payoff
vector r such that for the game Γ = (Ξ,r), SPE(Γ) 6= PBE(Γ).
The analogous result regarding equilibrium outcomes and equilibrium
payoffs is:
COROLLARY 2.2. Let Ξ be an extensive form such that, whenever an
information set u can be avoided in Ξ(u), it can only be avoided in Ξ(u) by
its owner, then for any possible payoff vector r, the game Γ = (Ξ,r) is such
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that SPEO(Γ) = PBEO(Γ). If Ξ is an extensive form with an information
set u that can be avoided in Ξ(u) by a different player than its owner, then
we can find a payoff vector r such that for the game Γ = (Ξ,r), SPEP(Γ) 6=
PBEP(Γ).
2.5. Examples
These results can be applied to many games considered in the economic
literature. It allows us to identify in a straightforward way the finite ex-
tensive form games of imperfect information for which subgame perfect
equilibria are still conforming with backward induction expressed in a se-
quential equilibrium.
Besley and Coate (1997) proposed an economic model of representa-
tive democracy. The political process is a three-stage game. In stage 1,
each citizen decides whether or not to become a candidate for public of-
fice. At the second stage, voting takes place over the list of candidates. At
stage 3 the candidate with the most votes chooses the policy. Besley and
Coate solved this model using subgame perfection and found multiple sub-
game perfect equilibria with very different outcomes in terms of number
of candidates. This may suggest that some refinement might give sharper
predictions. However, given the structure of the game that they consid-
ered, it follows immediately from the results of the previous section that all
subgame perfect equilibria in their model are also sequential. Thus, no ad-
ditional insights would be obtained by requiring this particular refinement.
The information structure of Besley and Coate’s model is a particu-
lar case of the more general framework offered by Fudenberg and Levine
(1983). They characterized the information structure of finite-horizon mul-
tistage games as “almost” perfect, since in each period players simultane-
ously choose actions, Nature never moves and there is no uncertainty at the
end of each stage. As they noticed, sequential equilibrium does not refine
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subgame perfection in this class of games. This can also be obtained as an
implication of Proposition 2.1 in the present paper.
In their version of the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model, Ada˜o and
Temzelides (1998) discussed both the issue of potential banking instability
as well as that of the decentralization of the optimal deposit contract. They
addressed the first question in a model with a “social planner” bank. The
bank offers the efficient contract as a deposit contract in the initial period. In
the first stage agents sequentially choose whether to deposit in the bank or
to remain in autarky. In the second stage, those agents who were selected by
Nature to be patient, simultaneously choose whether to misrepresent their
preferences and withdraw, or report truthfully and wait. The reduced normal
form of the game has two symmetric Nash equilibria in pure strategies.
The first one has all agents choosing depositing in the bank and reporting
faithfully, the second one has all agents choosing autarky. The fact that both
equilibria are sequential is presented in their Proposition 2. Because of the
game form they used, our Proposition 2.1 also implies their result.
In the implementation theory framework, Moore and Repullo (1988)
present the strength of subgame perfect implementation. If a choice func-
tion is implementable in subgame perfect equilibria by a given mechanism,
the strategy space is finite, and no information set is avoidable in its minimal
subform in the extensive form of the mechanism, then our work establishes
the implementability in sequential equilibrium. (See, for instance, the ex-
ample they study in Section 5, pp. 1213-1215.)
More examples can be found in Game Theory textbooks, like those of
Fudenberg and Tirole (1996), Myerson (1991) and Osborne and Rubinstein
(1994). Notice that whenever subgame perfect and sequential equilibrium
differ for an extensive game, there are information sets that are avoidable
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in its minimal subform. As examples consider Figures 8.4 and 8.5 in Fu-
denberg and Tirole (1996), Figures from 4.8 to 4.11 in Myerson (1991) and
Figures 225.1 and 230.1 in Osborne and Rubinstein (1994).
2.6. Appendix: Notation and Terminology
2.6.1. Extensive form. An n-player extensive form is a sextuple Ξ =
(T,≤,P,U,C, p), where T is the finite set of nodes and ≤ is a partial order
on T , representing precedence. We use the notation x < y to say that node y
comes after node x. The immediate predecessor of x is A(x) = max{y : y <
x}, and the set of immediate successors of x is S(x) = {y : x ∈ A(y)}. The
pair (T,≤) is a tree with a unique root α: for any x∈ T , x 6= α, there exists a
unique sequence α = x0,x1, . . . ,xn = x with xi ∈ S(xi−1), 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The set
of endpoints is Z = {x : S(x) = /0} and X = T \Z is the set of decision points.
We write Z(x) = {y ∈ Z : x < y} to denote the set of terminal successors of
x, and if E is an arbitrary set of nodes we write Z(E) = {z ∈ Z(x) : x ∈ E}.
2.6.2. Player partition. The player partition, P, is a partition of X into
sets P0,P1, . . . ,Pn, where Pi is the set of decision points of player i and P0
stands for the set of nodes where chance moves. The probability assignment
p specifies for every x ∈ P0 a completely mixed probability distribution px
on S(x).
2.6.3. Information partition. The information partition U is an n-
tuple (U1, . . . ,Un), where Ui is a partition of Pi into information sets of
player i, such that (i) if u ∈Ui, x,y ∈ u and x ≤ z for z ∈ X , then we cannot
have z < y, and (ii) if u ∈Ui, x,y ∈ u, then |S(x)|= |S(y)|. Therefore, if u is
an information set and x ∈ X , it makes sense to write u < x. Also, if u ∈Ui,
we often refer to player i as the owner of the information set u.
2.6.4. Choice partition. If u ∈Ui, the set Cu is the set of choices avail-
able for i at u. A choice c ∈ Cu is a collection of |u| nodes with one, and
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only one, element of S(x) for each x ∈ u. If player i chooses c ∈Cu at the
information set u ∈ Ui when she is actually at x ∈ u, then the next node
reached by the game is the element of S(x) contained in c. The entire col-
lection C = {Cu : u ∈ ⋃ni=1Ui} is called the choice partition. We assume
throughout that |Cu|> 1 for every information set u.
2.6.5. Extensive form game. We define a finite n-person extensive
form game as a pair Γ = (Ξ,r), where Ξ is an n-player extensive form and
r, the payoff function, is an n-tuple (r1, ...,rn), where ri is a real valued
function with domain Z. We assume throughout that the extensive form Ξ
satisfies perfect recall, i.e. for all i ∈ {1, ...,n}, u,v ∈Ui, c ∈Cu and x,y ∈ v,
we have c< x if and only if c< y. Therefore, we can say that choice c comes
before the information set v (to be denoted c < v) and that the information
set u comes before the information set v (to be denoted u < v).
2.6.6. Behavior strategies, beliefs and assessments. A behavior strat-
egy bi of player i is a sequence of functions (bui )u∈Ui such that bui : Cu →R+
and ∑c∈Cu bui (c) = 1,∀u. The set Bi represents the set of behavior strate-
gies available to player i. A behavior strategy profile is an element of
B = ∏ni=1 Bi. As common in extensive form games, we restrict attention
to behavior strategies.7 Throughout, we simply refer to them as strategies.
If bi ∈ Bi and c ∈Cu with u ∈Ui, then bi\c denotes the strategy bi changed
so that c is taken with probability one at u. If b ∈ B and b′i ∈ Bi then b\b′i is
the strategy profile (b1, . . . ,bi−1,b′i,bi+1, ...,bn). If c is a choice of player i
then b\c = b\b′i, where b′i = bi\c.
A system of beliefs µ is a function µ : X \P0 → [0,1] with ∑x∈u µ(x) = 1,
∀u. An assessment (b,µ) is a strategy profile together with a system of
beliefs.
7We can do this without loss of generality due to perfect recall and Kuhn’s Theorem,
see Kuhn (1953).
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2.6.7. Subforms and subgames. Let ˆT ⊂ T be a subset of nodes such
that (i) ∃y ∈ ˆT with y < x, ∀x ∈ ˆT , x 6= y, (ii) if x ∈ ˆT then S(x) ⊂ ˆT , and
(iii) if x ∈ ˆT and x ∈ u then u ⊂ ˆT . Then we say that Ξy = ( ˆT , ˆ≤, ˆP, ˆU , ˆC, pˆ)
is a subform of Ξ starting at y, where ( ˆ≤, ˆP, ˆU , ˆC, pˆ) are defined from Ξ in
ˆT by restriction. A subgame is a pair Γy = (Ξy, rˆ), where rˆ is the restriction
of r to the endpoints of Ξy. We denote by by the restriction of b ∈ B to the
subform Ξy (to the subgame Γy). The restriction of a system of beliefs µ to
the subform Ξy (to the subgame Γy) is denoted by µy.
CHAPTER 3
Undominated (and) Perfect Equilibria in Poisson Games1
3.1. Introduction
Models of population uncertainty have been introduced by Myerson
(1998, 2000) and Milchtaich (2004), in order to describe situations in which
players do not know the number of opponents. Among these games, a spe-
cial attention has been reserved to Poisson games, where the number of
players is a Poisson random variable with a given mean and where the play-
ers’ types are independent identically distributed random variables. The
properties of the Poisson distribution make Poisson games an extremely
convenient subclass of games. They are characterized by the properties
of independent actions (for every possible strategy profile the number of
players who take different actions are independent random variables) and
environmental equivalence (a player assesses the same probability for the
type profile of the others as an external observer does for the type profile of
the whole game, where a type profile is a vector that lists how many players
there are of each type).
Myerson (1998) extends the definition of Nash equilibrium and ac-
knowledges its existence. The existing literature on equilibrium refinements
in noncooperative game theory warns that we should be cautious about the
strategic stability of the Nash equilibrium concept. If this concern is well
founded, we can ask which Nash equilibria are self-enforcing in this setting.
The following example serves us to both introducing Poisson games to
the reader and illustrating the nature of the question. A player is sitting at
1This chapter is based on De Sinopoli and Gonzalez Pimienta (2007)
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home and faces two possible alternatives, either she goes out to some social
event, or she stays home. She does not know how many players are facing
this same disjunctive, but she knows that this number is a Poisson random
variable with parameter n. If she goes out and meets somebody she receives
a payoff equal to 1. If she meets nobody or decides to stay home, she gets
a payoff equal to 0. Every player faces this same two options and has the
same preferences.
The strategy “everybody stays home” is a Nash equilibrium of the de-
scribed game. However, we cannot consider it a good equilibrium since
players use a dominated strategy. It is not difficult to come up with similar
examples with patently implausible Nash equilibria.2
Recall that in conventional normal form games (from now on just nor-
mal form games), a modest refinement like perfection only selects undom-
inated strategies. This is the case in the previous example. However, in
Poisson games this is not true in general. We can go further, straightfor-
ward extensions of proper and strictly perfect equilibrium do not satisfy
undominance either and, in addition, not every game has a strictly perfect
equilibrium.
On the other hand, as it happens in normal form games, not every un-
dominated equilibrium is perfect. The same arguments that in normal form
games suggest that we should dispose of some of the undominated equilib-
ria that are not perfect are valid here. The difference being that, as argued
above, some perfect equilibria may be dominated.
We define undominated perfect equilibria for Poisson games as strategy
combinations that are limits of sequences of undominated equilibria of per-
turbed Poisson games. We prove that every Poisson game has at least one
2For instance, Myerson (2002), analyzing voting contexts, considers only Nash equi-
libria in which weakly dominated actions have been eliminated for all the types.
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undominated perfect equilibrium and that the set of undominated perfect
equilibria is exactly the set of perfect equilibria which are also undomi-
nated.
Our analysis is focused on Poisson games. However, we must point out
that none of the implications that we derive relies on the specific shape of
the Poisson distribution. Only some payoffs and thresholds used in some
examples would have to be recomputed if we want to translate them into a
framework with a different underlying probability distribution.
This paper is organized as follows: In the next section we formally de-
fine Poisson games, strategies and Nash equilibria. We closely follow the
description of Poisson games made by Myerson (1998). The third section
is devoted to examine the properties of undominated strategies in Poisson
games, where we show that there exist important asymmetries with respect
to normal form games. The fourth section studies the perfect equilibrium
concept and some of its possible variations. We define the concept of un-
dominated perfect equilibrium for Poisson games in Section 3.5, where
some of its properties are also proven.
3.2. Preliminaries
Recall that a Poisson random variable is a discrete probability distribu-
tion that takes only one parameter. The probability that a Poisson random
variable of parameter n takes the value k, being k a nonnegative integer, is
f (k;n) = e−n n
k
k! .
A Poisson game Γ is a five-tuple (n,T,r,C,u). The number of players in
the game is a Poisson random variable with parameter n > 0. The set T rep-
resents the set of possible types of players, we assume it to be a nonempty
finite set.
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As usual, if A is a finite set, ∆(A) represents the set of probability dis-
tributions over A. Given the event that a player is in the game, she is of
type t ∈ T with probability r(t). This information is contained in the vector
r ∈ ∆(T ). The decomposition property of the Poisson distribution implies
that for each type t in T , the number of players of the game whose type is t
is a Poisson random variable with parameter nr(t). These random variables
together are mutually independent and form a vector, called the type profile,
which lists the number of players in the game who have each type.
For any finite set S, we denote as Z(S) the set of elements w ∈ RS such
that w(s) is a nonnegative integer for all s ∈ S. Using this notation, the set
Z(T ) denotes the set of possible values for the type profile in the game.
The set C is the set of available choices or pure actions that a player
may take. We assume that it is common to all players regardless of their
type and that it is a finite set containing at least two different alternatives.
The set ∆(C) is the set of mixed actions. Henceforth, we refer to mixed
actions simply as actions.
The utility to each player depends on her type, on the action that she
chooses and on the number of players, not counting herself, who choose
each possible action. A vector that lists these numbers of players for each
possible element of C is called an action profile and belongs to the set Z(C).
We assume that preferences of a player of type t can be summarized with a
bounded function ut : C×Z(C)→ R, i.e. ut(b,x) is the payoff that a player
of type t receives if she takes the pure action b and the number of players
who choose action c is x(c), for all c ∈C. Furthermore, let u = (ut)t∈T .
In games with population uncertainty, as Myerson (1998, p. 377) ar-
gues, “. . . players’ perceptions about each others’ strategic behavior cannot
be formulated as a strategy profile that assigns a randomized strategy to
each specific individual of the game, because a player is not aware of the
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specific identities of all the other players”. Notice that two players of the
same type do not have any other known characteristic by which others can
assess different conducts. The conclusion of the previous reasoning is that
a strategy σ is an element of (∆(C))T , i.e. a mapping from the set of types
to the set of possible actions.3
This symmetry assumption is a fundamental part of the description of
the game. Notice that it is not made for convenience, on the contrary, sym-
metry is a critical assumption of a model of population uncertainty for it to
be meaningful and well constructed.
If players play according to the strategy σ, σt(c) is the probability that
a player of type t chooses the pure action c. The decomposition property of
the Poisson distribution implies that the number of players of type t ∈ T who
choose the pure action c is a Poisson distribution with parameter nr(t)σt(c).
The aggregation property of the Poisson distribution implies that any sum
of independent Poisson random variables is also a Poisson random variable.
It follows that the total number of players who take the pure action c is a
Poisson distribution with parameter nτ(c), where τ(c) = ∑t∈T r(t)σt(c).
A player of type t who plays the pure action b∈C while all other players
are expected to play according to σ has expected utility equal to
Ut(b,σ) = ∑
x∈Z(C)
P(x|σ)ut(b,x)
where,
P(x|σ) = ∏
c∈C
e−nτ(c)
(nτ(c))x(c)
x(c)!
3One may wonder how the game might be affected if the subdivision of types was
finer, thus, allowing a larger variety of different behaviors. Myerson (1998) proves that,
for Poisson games, utility-irrelevant subdivitions of types cannot substantially change the
set of Nash equilibria (Theorem 4, page 386).
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and her expected utility from playing action θ ∈ ∆(C) is
Ut(θ,σ) = ∑
b∈C
θ(b)Ut(b,σ).
The set of best responses for a player of type t against a strategy σ is
the set of actions that maximizes her expected utility given that the rest of
the players, including those whose type is t, behave as prescribed by σ.
The set PBRt(σ) = {c ∈C : c ∈ argmaxb∈C Ut(b,σ)} is the set of pure best
responses against σ for a player of type t. The set of mixed best responses
against σ for a player of type t is the set of actions BRt(σ) = ∆(PBRt(σ)).
DEFINITION 3.1. The strategy σ∗ is a Nash equilibrium if σ∗t ∈BRt(σ∗)
for all t.
Standard fixed-point arguments show that every Poisson Game has at
least one Nash equilibrium, see Myerson (1998).
3.3. Dominated Strategies
The admissibility principle, which in normal form games stipulates that
no player must choose a dominated strategy, translates into the current
framework imposing that no player should choose a dominated action.
DEFINITION 3.2. The action θ ∈ ∆(C) is dominated for a player of type
t if there exists an alternative action θ′ such that Ut(θ,σ) ≤ Ut(θ′,σ), for
every possible strategy σ and Ut(θ,σ′)<Ut(θ′,σ′) for at least one σ′.
Although contained in a voting framework, Myerson (2002) offers a
weaker definition of dominated action. Under such definition the (pure)
action c is dominated for a player of type t if there exists an alternative
(pure) action b such that ut(c,x) ≤ ut(b,x) for every x ∈ Z(C) and with
strict inequality for at least one x′. However, we prefer the former since it is
equivalent to the definition of dominated strategy for normal form games.
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In games with population uncertainty dominated strategies are defined
in the following way:
DEFINITION 3.3. A strategy σ is dominated if there is some type t for
which σt is a dominated action.
We can use this formal apparatus to revisit the example discussed in the
introduction. Let a stand for “going out” and b for “staying home”:
EXAMPLE 3.1. Let Γ be a Poisson game with n > 0, only one possible
type, set of available choices C = {a,b}, and utility function:
u(a,x) =

1 if x(a)> 0
0 otherwise
u(b,x) = 0 ∀x ∈ Z(C).
Since this Poisson game has only one possible type, we can identify the
set of strategies with the set of actions. There are two equilibria, a and b. We
have already argued that the equilibrium strategy b is unsatisfactory. Notice
that b is a dominated action, even when we consider the weaker definition
given by Myerson (2002), which makes b a dominated strategy.
The example highlights that the Nash equilibrium concept is inadequate
for Poisson games since it allows for equilibrium points where players use
dominated actions (strategies).
In normal form games it is well known that a dominated strategy is
never a best response against a completely mixed strategy of the opponents.
This property implies, for instance, that a perfect equilibrium only selects
undominated strategies. Ideally, we would like to establish an analogy be-
tween the properties of (un)dominated strategies in normal form games and
(un)dominated actions in Poisson games. In the remainder of this section
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we examine which are the differences and similarities between the two set-
tings with regard to (un)dominated strategies.
The following straightforward result is true in both cases, although it has
to be stated in terms of strategies for normal form games. (Henceforth we
skip this last clarification when comparing actions of Poisson games with
strategies of normal form games.)
LEMMA 3.1. If a pure action is dominated then every mixed action that
gives positive probability to that pure action is also dominated.
This implies that a strategy that prescribes that some type plays an action
which gives positive probability to a dominated pure action is dominated.
On the other hand, as so happens in normal form games, a dominated mixed
action does not necessarily give positive weight to a dominated pure action.
We illustrate this in the following example.
EXAMPLE 3.2. Consider a Poisson game with an expected number of
players such that n > ln2, only one possible type, three available choices in
the set C = {a,b,c}, and utility function:
u(a,x) =

10 if x(a)≥ x(b)
0 otherwise
u(b,x) =

10 if x(a)< x(b)
0 otherwise
u(c,x) = 6 ∀x ∈ Z(C).
The pure action a is not dominated. It is the unique best response against
the strategy a. The pure action b is not dominated either. In particular,
notice that it is not dominated by a, given the assumption that n > ln2,
whose unique purpose is to make sufficiently small the probability that the
number of players who turn up in the game is equal to zero. As for the pure
action c, it does better than a against the strategy b and better than b against
the strategy a.
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The mixed action θ = 1/2a+1/2b is dominated by the pure action θ′ =
c. To see this note that given a strategy, we can assign probability p to the
event x(a) ≥ x(b) and probability 1− p to the event x(a) < x(b). We can
compute the expected utility of playing action θ = 1/2a+1/2b as 1/2(1−
p)10+1/2p10 = 5.
Therefore, we have proved:
LEMMA 3.2. An action that does not give positive probability to a dom-
inated pure action may be dominated.
It is also true that a pure strategy may only be dominated by a mixed
strategy. Modify the utility function of the previous example so that
u(x,c) = 4 for all x in Z(C), and raise the lower bound of n to ln(5/2).
In this modified game, the pure action c is dominated by neither a nor b, but
it is dominated by the action θ = 1/2a+1/2b.
In normal form games, the process of discerning which strategies are
dominated is simplified by the fact that it suffices to consider only pure
strategies of the opponents. As the next example illustrates, this is not
enough in Poisson games.
EXAMPLE 3.3. Let Γ be a Poisson game with expected number of play-
ers equal to n, only one possible type, set of choices equal to C = {a,b,c},
and utility function:
u(a,x) =

1 if x(a) = x(b)> 0
0 otherwise
u(b,x) =

1 if x(a) = x(b)> 0
0 otherwise
u(c,x) = 0 ∀x ∈ Z(C).
The pure action c does strictly worse than the pure actions a and b if and
only if the strategy σ gives strictly positive probability to both a and b.
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Nevertheless, to compute expected payoffs and, therefore, to identify
dominated actions for one player of some type, it suffices to consider that
every other player plays the same action, regardless of her type. This is
so because from the strategy σ ∈ (∆(C))T we can define a global action
τ∈∆(C) given by τ(c)=∑t∈T r(t)σt(c), which implies the same probability
distribution over the set of action profiles Z(C).
An important fact about undominated strategies in normal form games
is that a strategy is undominated if and only if it is a best response against
some element contained in the interior of the simplex of the set of pure
strategy combinations of the opponents. As mentioned above this implies
that a perfect equilibrium only selects undominated strategies. Our previ-
ous circumspection suggests that things may work differently in the present
framework. As it turns out, no result similar to this is true for Poisson
games.
If A is a finite set, let ∆0(A) stand for the set of probability distributions
over A that give positive probability to every element of A.
LEMMA 3.3. An undominated action may be a best response against no
element of ∆0(CT ).
PROOF. Consider a Poisson game with expected number of players
n = 1,4 only one possible type so that ∆0(CT ) = (∆0(C))T , set of available
choices equal to C = {a,b,c} and utility function:
4The set of examples in the paper is designed to be as clear and simple as possible.
This is the reason why we many times fix the expected number of players to be n = 1 or
n = 2. This contrasts with the fact that Poisson games fit more naturally to a situation
where the expected number of players is large. At the expense of computational simplicity,
similar examples can be constructed that put no restrictions on the Poisson parameter n.
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u(a,x) =

5e if x(a) = 1 and x(c) = 0
5e if x(c)> 0
0 otherwise
u(b,x) =

5e if x(b) = 1 and x(c) = 0
5e if x(c)> 0
0 otherwise
u(c,x) = 4 ∀x ∈ Z(C).
If a player expects every other potential player to behave according to
the strategy σ = b, the action c gives her a larger payoff than the action a. In
turn, if she expects every other potential player to behave according to the
strategy σ = a, the action c gives her a larger payoff than the action b. To
see that no mixed action between a and b dominates c, consider that σ = a,
then the following inequalities hold:
U(b,σ) = 0 <U(c,σ) = 4 <U(a,σ) = 5.
From here it follows that under the strategy σ = a, the action c does strictly
better than the action θ = λa+(1−λ)b for λ ∈ [0,4/5). If σ = b,
U(a,σ) = 0 <U(c,σ) = 4 <U(b,σ) = 5,
in which case the action c does better than the action θ = λa+(1−λ)b for
λ ∈ (1/5,1]. Therefore, no mixed action between a and b does always at
least as good as the action c for every possible strategy σ.
It remains to prove that the action c is never a best response to any
strategy σ. Consider first the case where σ randomizes only between a and
b. Note that to minimize the maximum payoff obtained by playing either a
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or b we need σ = 1/2a+1/2b. However, in such a case
4 =U(c,σ)<U(a,σ) =U(b,σ) = 5
2
√
e.
Finally, the action c is never a best response against any completely
mixed strategy because any weight that the strategy σ puts in the choice c
increases the expected payoff from both the actions a and b. 
The next lemma completes the previous one. In Poisson games a dom-
inated action can be a best response even if every other player uses a com-
pletely mixed action.
LEMMA 3.4. A dominated action may be a best response against a com-
pletely mixed strategy.
PROOF. Consider the following example:
EXAMPLE 3.4. Let Γ be a Poisson game with expected number of play-
ers equal to n = 2, only one possible type, set of choices C = {a,b}, and
utility function
u(a,x) = e−2 ∀x
u(b,x) =

1 if x(a) = x(b) = 1
0 otherwise.
Notice that e−2 is the probability that x(a) = x(b) = 1 under the strategy
σ = 1/2a+ 1/2b. Also notice that the action b is dominated by the action
a, the former only does as good as the latter against the strategy σ = 1/2a+
1/2b, and does strictly worse for any other strategy σ′ 6= σ. However, it is a
best response against σ ∈ ∆0(C). 
As we mentioned above, in normal form games undominated strategies
are characterized by the existence of a probability distribution in the interior
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of the simplex of the set of pure strategy combinations of the opponents,
against which the undominated strategy is a best response. This property
gives a means of proposing equilibrium concepts that ensure that no player
chooses a dominated strategy.
In normal form games the admissibility requirement is taken care of by
perfection. Every perfect equilibrium selects only undominated strategies
and, moreover, perfect equilibrium conditions do not admit just every equi-
librium in undominated strategies, but only a subset of them.
Mertens (2004) links undominance and perfection through the concept
of admissibility. He defines 3 possible concepts of admissible best response:
(α) θ is an admissible best response against σ if there exists a sequence
of completely mixed σk converging to σ such that θ is a best re-
sponse against each (σk).
(β) θ is an admissible best response against σ if θ is a best response
against σ and there exist completely mixed σ′ such that θ is a best
response against σ′.
(γ) θ is an admissible best response against σ if θ is a best response
against σ and no other best response θ′ is at least as good against
every σ′ and better against some.
The third concept corresponds to the usual concept of admissibility, i.e.
undominance, while the first one is a characterization of perfect equilibria.
In normal form games, the first concept is strictly stronger than the second,
which in turn is strictly stronger than the third.
Lemmas 3.3 and 3.4 cast doubt upon the fact that the previous relation-
ship holds for Poisson games (apart from the fact that the second concept is
clearly weaker than the first). We are interested in finding out if there is any
connection between α and γ in the present setting. Once we know this, we
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will be able to propose a definition of a strong version of admissibility for
Poisson games.
This is done in Section 3.5. Before that we have to extend the perfect
equilibrium concept to Poisson games and look into its properties.
3.4. Perfection
Three equivalent definitions of perfect equilibrium have been proposed
for normal form games. One based on perturbed games (Selten, 1975),
a second one based on the item α of the previous list (also Selten, 1975)
and a last one based on ε-perfect equilibria (Myerson, 1978). Below we
provide the three corresponding definitions for Poisson games and prove
their equivalence, so that we always have the most advantageous definition
available.
The leading definition that we use is the one based on perturbed games
DEFINITION 3.4. Let Γ be a Poisson Game, for every t ∈ T , let ηt and
Σt(ηt) be defined by:
ηt ∈ RC with ηt(c)> 0 for all c ∈C and ∑
c∈C
ηt(c)< 1
Σt(ηt) = {θ ∈ ∆(C) : θ(c)≥ ηt(c) for all c ∈C}.
Furthermore, let η = (ηt)t . The perturbed Poisson game (Γ,η) is the Pois-
son game (n,T,r,C,u) where players of type t are restricted to play only
actions in Σt(ηt), for every t.
In the perturbed Poisson game (Γ,η), an action θ∈ Σt(ηt) is a best reply
against σ ∈ Σ(η) = ∏t∈T Σt(ηt) for a player of type t if every pure action c
that is not a best response in Γ against σ for a player of type t is played with
minimum probability, that is to say, σt(c) = ηt(c). A strategy σ ∈ Σ(η) is
an equilibrium of the perturbed Poisson game (Γ,η) if for every type t, σt
is a best response to σ in (Γ,η). Kakutani fixed point theorem implies that:
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LEMMA 3.5. Every perturbed Poisson game has an equilibrium.
Perturbed games lead to the following definition of perfection:
DEFINITION 3.5. A strategy σ is a perfect equilibrium if it is the limit
point of a sequence {ση}η→0, where ση is an equilibrium of the perturbed
game (Γ,η), for all η.
Since every perturbed Poisson game has an equilibrium and since this
equilibrium is contained in the compact set (∆(C))T , every Poisson game
has a perfect equilibrium.5 By continuity of the utility function, every per-
fect equilibrium is also a Nash equilibrium.
As we mentioned earlier, another possible definition of perfect equi-
librium uses ε-perfect equilibria. A completely mixed strategy σε is an
ε-perfect equilibrium if it satisfies:
Ut(c,σε)<Ut(d,σε), then σεt (c)≤ ε for all t ∈ T.
What follows is an adaption to Poisson games of some results and proofs
of the book of van Damme (1991, pp. 26–29) for perfect equilibrium in
normal form games. Although this is rather straightforward, we include it
here to maintain the paper self-contained. The next lemma lists the two
remaining concepts of perfect equilibrium and proves their equivalence.
LEMMA 3.6. Let Γ be a Poisson game, and let σ ∈ (∆(C))T . The fol-
lowing assertions are equivalent:
(1) σ is a perfect equilibrium of Γ,
(2) σ is a limit point of a sequence {σε}ε→0, where σε is an ε-perfect
equilibrium of Γ, for all ε, and
5Take any sequence of η → 0, and for each η, an equilibrium ση of (Γ,η). The se-
quence {ση}η→0 has a convergent subsequence whose limit point is a perfect equilibrium.
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(3) σ is a limit point of a sequence {σε}ε→0 of completely mixed strat-
egy combinations with the property that, for all t, σt is a best re-
sponse against each element σε in this sequence.
PROOF. (1)→(2): Let σ be a limit point of a sequence {ση}η→0, where
ση is equilibrium of Γ(η) for all η. Define ε(η) ∈ R++ by
ε(η) = max
t,c
ηt(c).
Then ση is an ε(η)-perfect equilibrium for Γ.
(2)→(3): Let {σε}ε→0 be a sequence of ε-perfect equilibria with limit
σ. By continuity, every element of the carrier of σ, which from now on we
denote as C (σ), is a best response against σ(ε) for ε close enough to zero.
(3)→(1): Let {σε}ε→0 be a sequence as in (3) with limit σ. Define ηε
by:
ηεt (c) =

σεt (c) if c /∈C(σt)
ε otherwise
for all t,c.
For ε small enough σε is equilibrium of the perturbed Poisson game (Γ,ηε),
which establishes (1). 
EXAMPLE 3.4 (Continued). We already saw that the action b is domi-
nated by the action a and that both are best responses against σ = 1/2a+
1/2b. By Lemma 3.1, the action θ = 1/2a+ 1/2b is also dominated by a.
Nevertheless it is a best response against the strategy σ. Consequently, the
dominated strategy σ is a perfect equilibrium.
The next example is more illustrative in showing how the perfect equi-
librium concept fails to select only undominated strategies in Poisson
games.
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EXAMPLE 3.5. Consider the Poisson game Γ = {n,T,r,C,u}, with ex-
pected number of players n = 2, set of types T = {1,2}, with equal proba-
bility for each type r(1) = r(2) = 1/2, set of choices C = {a,b}, and utility
function:
u1(a,x) =

1 if x(b) = 1
0 otherwise
u1(b,x) = e−1 ∀x ∈ Z(C)
u2(a,x) = e−1 ∀x ∈ Z(C)
u2(b,x) =

1 if x(a) = 1
0 otherwise.
The number of players of type 1 is a Poisson random variable with ex-
pected value equal to 1. The same is true for type 2. Notice also that
e−1 coincides with the probability that a Poisson random variable of pa-
rameter 1 is equal to 1. The action a is dominated for players of type 1,
while action b is dominated for players of type 2. We claim that the strat-
egy σ = (σ1,σ2) = (a,b) is a perfect equilibrium. Take the sequence of
ε-perfect equilibria σε1 = (1− ε)a+ εb, σε2 = εa+(1− ε)b. For every ε,
Ut(a,σε) =Ut(b,σε), and the sequence {σε}ε→0 converges to σ.
Each one of this last two examples actually proves the next proposition:
PROPOSITION 3.1. A Perfect equilibrium can be dominated.
Hence, the doubts that we have raised at the end of the previous section
are justified. In Poisson games, the relationship between α and γ of the
possible concepts of admissible best response listed by Mertens is different
from the one that holds in normal form games.
In the last example, the undominated equilibrium σ = (σ1,σ2) = (b,a)
is also perfect. The next question that we must answer is whether or not
undominance implies perfection. Proposition 3.2 shows that in this case
things work as they do in normal form games.
PROPOSITION 3.2. An undominated equilibrium may not be perfect.
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PROOF. Consider a Poisson game Γ, with expected number of players
equal to n, two possible types with equal probabilities, i.e. T = {1,2} and
r(1) = r(2) = 1/2, set of available choices C = {a,b,c} and utility func-
tion:6
u1(a,x) = x(a)+ x(b)
u1(b,x) = |x(a)+ x(b)− x(c)|
u1(c,x) = 0 ∀x ∈ Z(C)
u2(a,x) = x(a)
u2(b,x) = 0 ∀x ∈ Z(C)
u2(c,x) = 0 ∀x ∈ Z(C).
The game has a continuum of undominated equilibria (λa+(1−λ)b,a),
for λ taking values in the closed interval [0,1]. Note, in particular, that the
action b is not dominated for players of type 1 since it does better than the
action a against the strategy σ = (σ1,σ2) = (c,c). However, the strategy
σˆ = (σˆ1, σˆ2) = (a,a) is the unique perfect equilibrium of the game. 
The example used in the proof of the last proposition depicts that there
may be unreasonable equilibria in undominated strategies. Consider the
strategy σ′ = (λa+(1−λ)b,a) with λ ∈ [0,1). It is difficult to justify that
a player of type 1 will stick to the prescribed strategy. A rational player
should not risk his equilibrium payoff, even more when there is no possible
expected benefit from such behavior. Suppose there was an unexpected
deviation from σ′ toward c, placing weight in the action b would pay off to
players of type 1 if and only if such a deviation was drastic and it would
hurt otherwise.
6Notice that the utility functions that we use in this example, and in some of the follow-
ing ones are not bounded, as we assumed in the general description of Poisson games made
in Section 3.2. The main features of all the examples discussed are preserved if we put an
upper bound on utilities, that is to say, if utilities are given by u˜t(y,x) = min{ut(y,x),K},
where K is a sufficiently large number with respect to n. However, we maintain the un-
bounded functions for the sake of simplicity.
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Since perfection does not imply undominance and undominance does
not imply perfection, we would like to have available an equilibrium con-
cept that implies both. At this early stage, we do not want to go very far
apart from the perfect equilibrium concept. We notice, nevertheless, that
the equilibrium discussed in Example 3.5 is also proper, for a straightfor-
ward extension of this concept to Poisson games, 7 since every player has
only two possible choices.8 Strictly perfect equilibrium, does not help ei-
ther. As argued above, the strategy σ = 1/2a+1/2b is an equilibrium of the
7A completely mixed strategy σε is an ε -proper equilibrium if it satisfies:
Ut(c,σε)<Ut(d,σε), then σεt (c)≤ εσεt (d) for all t ∈ T.
A strategy σ is proper if it is a limit point of a sequence {σε}ε→0, where σε is an
ε-proper equilibrium of Γ, for all ε.
8As it should be expected, not every proper equilibrium is perfect. Consider the Pois-
son game Γ= {n,T,r,C,u}, with expected number of players n= 2, two possible types that
are equally probable, i.e. T = {1,2} and r(1) = r(2) = 1/2, set of choices C = {a,b,c,d}
and utility function:
u1(x,a) = 0 ∀x
u1(x,b) = x(d)− x(c)
u1(x,c) =−1 ∀x
u1(x,d) =−2 ∀x
u2(x,a) =

1 if x(b) = 1
0 otherwise
u2(x,b) = e−1 ∀x
u2(x,c) =−1 ∀x
u2(x,d) =−2 ∀x.
The action a is dominated for players of type 2 by action b. The strategy σ =
(σ1,σ2) = (b,a) is perfect. To see this consider the sequence of ε-perfect equilibria:
σε1 =
1
3 εa+(1− ε)b+ 13 εc+ 13 εd
σε2 = (1− ε−2ε2)a+ εb+ ε2c+ ε2d
For every type, action d is always strictly worse than action c, hence, in any ε-proper
equilibrium, the former is played with strictly less probability than the latter. Therefore, a
player of type 1 plays the action b with a probability less than ε times the probability that
she gives to a. Hence, in no proper equilibrium she plays b with positive probability.
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Poisson game described in Example 3.4. Notice that this equilibrium uses
completely mixed strategies, and consequently, it is a strictly perfect equi-
librium (again, using a straightforward extension of the concept to Poisson
games).9
Examples 3.4 and 3.5 suggest that we may also demand robustness
against perturbations other than trembles. (In Example 3.4, the payoff e−2
coincides with the probability that x(a) = x(b) = 1 under the strategy σ =
1/2a+1/2b. In example 3.5 the payoff e−1 coincides with the probability
that x(a) = 1, also that x(b) = 1, under the strategy σ = (σ1,σ2) = (a,b).)
Specifically, perturbations in the Poisson parameter n seem like the natu-
ral candidate as the model is of population uncertainty. Let us study the
following equilibrium concept.
DEFINITION 3.6. The strategy σ is a perfect∗ equilibrium of the Pois-
son game Γ = (n,T,r,C,u) if there exists a ξ > 0 such that σ is a perfect
equilibrium of the Poisson game ˜Γ = (n˜,T,r,C,u) for all n˜ ∈ (n−ξ,n+ξ).
A perfect∗ equilibrium is a perfect equilibrium, not only of the original
game, but also of every game that is obtained by small perturbations in
the expected number of players. Notice that we cannot rely exclusively on
perturbations in the expected numbers of players. One can easily construct
9In addition strictly perfect equilibrium does not satisfy existence. To see this, con-
sider a Poisson game with expected number of players n > 0, only one possible type, four
different choices C = {a,b,c,d} and utility function:
u(a,x) = 1+ x(c)
u(b,x) = 1+ x(d)
u(c,x) = 0 ∀x
u(d,x) = 0 ∀x.
Notice that there is no equilibrium that is “robust” to every possible tremble.
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examples that do not pose any restriction in the expected number of players
with unreasonable Nash equilibria. See for instance Example 3.1.
Let us analyze why the perfect∗ equilibrium concept is not adequate by
means of the following example.
EXAMPLE 3.6. Consider the family of Poisson games with expected
number of players equal to n > 47 ,
10 with only one type, set of choices C =
{a,b}, and utility function:
u(a,x) = x(b)
u(b,x) =

1 if x(a) = x(b) = 0
2x(a) otherwise.
Every game has a unique equilibrium and it depends on n.11 Conse-
quently, it does not have a perfect∗ equilibrium.
This example prompts us to discard the previous equilibrium concept
and reveals that demanding stability against variations in the Poisson pa-
rameter n forces to tolerate, at least, smooth variations of the equilibrium
strategy if we want to retain existence. Therefore, if σ is a perfect equilib-
rium of Γ, we may want any game that only differs from Γ in that it has a
slightly different number of expected players to have a perfect equilibrium
that is not far away from σ.
As the next example shows, this relaxation would bring back dominated
equilibria.
EXAMPLE 3.7. Let Γ be a Poisson game with expected number of play-
ers equal to n = 6, two different types T = {1,2} with r(1) = 2/3 and
10It is enough that n is such that ln n >−n.
11The unique equilibrium is σ = αa+(1−α)b, where α = (1− 1
nen
)
/
(
3− 2
en
)
.
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r(2) = 1/3, set of available choices C = {a,b,c,d}, and utility function:
u1(h,x) = 0 ∀x ∈ Z(C),∀h ∈C
u2(a,x) =

1 if x(c) = x(d) = 1
0 otherwise
u2(b,x) = e−2 ∀x ∈ Z(C)
u2(h,x) =−1 ∀x ∈ Z(C),h = c,d.
Notice first that the number of players with type 1 is a Poisson ran-
dom variable of parameter 4. The strategy σ = (σ1,σ2) = (1/4a+1/4b+
1/4c+ 1/4d,a) implies that the event x(c) = x(d) = 1 occurs with proba-
bility e−2. The strategy σ is a perfect equilibrium where players of type 2
play dominated strategies. Take g to be a small number. The Poisson game
Γg = {n+ g,T,r,C,u} has a dominated perfect equilibrium very close to
σ where players of type 1 play action (1/4+κ,1/4+κ,1/4−κ,1/4−κ),
for κ = g/(24 + 4g), and players of type 2 play action a. On the other
hand, the Poisson game Γg = {n− g,T,r,C,u} also has a dominated per-
fect equilibrium very close to σ, where players of type 1 play action
(1/4− κ′,1/4− κ′,1/4+ κ′,1/4+ κ′), for κ′ = g/(24− 4g), and players
of type 2 play action a.
So far we have provided a number of results and examples that show
that some equilibrium concepts proposed for normal form games do not
retain either admissibility or existence when extended to Poisson games. In
the next section we propose an equilibrium concept that shows that, in this
setting, these properties are not incompatible.
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3.5. Undominated Perfect Equilibria
The same arguments that in normal form games compel to dispose of
the undominated equilibria that are not perfect are also well founded here.
Perfection is a weak requirement, it asks for stability against one single
perturbation, not against every possible perturbation. As a result, equilibria
that are not perfect are very unstable.
The main difference in the current setting is that there are perfect equi-
libria that are dominated. We want to put forward a strong version of admis-
sibility for games with population uncertainty. Such a definition comprises
items α and γ from the list of possible concepts of admissibility provided
by Mertens (2004) and listed at the end of Section 3.3.
DEFINITION 3.7. θ is an admissible best response against σ if it is un-
dominated and there exists a sequence of completely mixed σk converging
to σ such that θ is a best response against each (σk).
Accordingly, we may say that the strategy σ is admissible if for every
t, σt is an admissible best response against σ. Therefore, if σ is an admis-
sible strategy it is a perfect equilibrium, and we may talk about the set of
admissible equilibria.
We want to propose an equilibrium concept that satisfies admissibility
and that generates a nonempty set of equilibria for any game. Such a con-
cept is introduced in Definition 3.8, the admissibility property will come
directly from the definition and the existence result is offered in Proposi-
tion 3.4. The following Proposition shows that every Poisson game has an
equilibrium in undominated strategies. It could have been proposed as a
corollary of our main existence result. However, we prefer to invert the
order of presentation so that the argument of the main proof can be more
easily followed.
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We proceed to prove that every Poisson game has an equilibrium in un-
dominated strategies. Lemma 3.2 implies that the set of undominated strate-
gies is not convex and, hence, we could not show existence of undominated
equilibria using a standard fixed point argument in this set. A constructive
proof shows that:
PROPOSITION 3.3. Every Poisson game has a Nash equilibrium in un-
dominated strategies.
PROOF. Consider a Poisson game Γ, with set of choices C and utility
vector u. Recall that if θ is an action, C (θ) denotes the carrier of θ. Notice
that if C (θ)⊆ C (θ′) then there exist a λ ∈ (0,1) and an action θ′′ such that
θ′ = λθ+(1− λ)θ′′. If θ is dominated for players of type t, there exists
a ˜θ that dominates it, and a σˆ such that Ut(θ, σˆ) < Ut(˜θ, σˆ). Moreover, if
C (θ)⊆ C (θ′) then θ′ = λθ+(1−λ)θ′′ is dominated by ˜θ′ = λ˜θ+(1−λ)θ′′
and Ut(θ′, σˆ)<Ut( ˜θ′, σˆ).
This implies that we can talk about dominated carriers and that, given
a dominated carrier C there exists a strategy σˆ such that any action with
carrier that contains C is dominated by an action that is a strictly better
response to σˆ.
Consider the set of all possible carriers, and call Dt the finite set of all
dominated carriers for players of type t. For each minimal element of Dt ,
say dt , let σdt be a strategy such that any action with carrier that contains dt
is dominated by an action that is a strictly better response to such a strategy.
Let Mt be the set of minimal elements of Dt .
For λ > 0, define a new Poisson game Γλ, with utility vector given by
uλt (c,x) = ut(c,x)+λ ∑
dt∈Mt
Ut(c,σdt )
3.5. UNDOMINATED PERFECT EQUILIBRIA 53
which implies expected utilities,
Uλt (θt ,σ) =Ut(θt ,σ)+λ ∑
dt∈Mt
Ut(θt ,σdt ).
This new Poisson game has an equilibrium. Moreover, no dominated
action of the original game is used with positive probability in that equilib-
rium. Take a sequence of λ → 0. There exists a subsequence of equilibria
{σλ}λ that converges to some σ¯. By continuity of the utility function, σ¯ is
an equilibrium in undominated strategies of the original game. 
In Section 3.4 we have defined perturbed Poisson games. In a perturbed
game (Γ,η) an action θ ∈ Σt(ηt) is dominated for type t if there exists
an alternative action θ′ ∈ Σt(ηt) such that Ut(θ,σ) ≤ Ut(θ′,σ), for every
possible strategy σ ∈ Σ(η) and Ut(θ,σ′) < Ut(θ′,σ′) for at least one σ′ ∈
Σ(η).
We could strenght the definition of perfection (Definition 3.5), asking
the equilibria in the sequence to be undominated:
DEFINITION 3.8. A strategy σ is an undominated perfect equilibrium
of a Poisson game Γ if it is the limit point of a sequence {ση}η→0 where ση
is an undominated equilibrium of (Γ,η) for all η.
Every perturbed Poisson game has an undominated equilibrium.12
Moreover, for η close to zero the sets of dominated carriers in Γ and in
12To see this, a modification of the proof of Proposition 3.3 would do, where the
carrier of an action is defined as the set of pure actions that receive strictly more probability
than the minimum weight imposed by η.
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(Γ,η) coincide for every possible type. Hence, every undominated per-
fect equilibrium is perfect and undominated (i.e., it satisfies our strong ver-
sion of admissibility). Since every pertubed Poisson game has an undomi-
nated equilibrium and since this equilibrium is contained in the compact set
(∆(C))T it follows:13
PROPOSITION 3.4. Every Poisson game has an undominated perfect
equilibrium.
The definition appears to be stronger than requiring separately perfec-
tion and undominance because it poses restrictions in the sequence of equi-
libria of the associated perturbed Poisson games. The next Proposition
shows that both definitions are equivalent. This fact, in view of Lemma
3.6, simplifies the analysis of undominated perfect equilibrium in Poisson
games.
PROPOSITION 3.5. The set of undominated perfect equilibria coincides
with the intersection of the set of undominated equilibria with the set of
perfect equilibria.
PROOF. Let σ belong both to the set of perfect equilibria and to the set
of undominated equilibria of Γ. Since σ is perfect it is the limit point of
a sequence {ση}η→0 where ση is an equilibrium of (Γ,η). Because σ is
undominated, its carrier is not a dominated one. Moreover, for η close to
zero the sets of dominated carriers in Γ and in (Γ,η) coincide for every
possible type. For each η, let η′ be defined by:
η′t(c) =

σηt (c) if σt(c) = 0
ηt(c) otherwise
for all c, t.
13See footnote 5.
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Then ση′ = ση is an undominated equilibrium of (Γ,η′). Moreover the
sequence of η′ converges to zero. Hence, σ is the limit point of the sequence
{ση′}η′→0 of undominated equilibria for (Γ,η′). 

CHAPTER 4
Generic Determinacy of Nash Equilibrium in Network
Formation Games
4.1. Introduction
A basic tool in applying noncooperative game theory is to have a finite
set of probability distributions on outcomes derived from equilibria.1 When
utilities are defined over the relevant outcome space, it is well know that this
is generically the case when we can assign a different outcome to each pure
strategy profile (Harsanyi, 1973), or to each ending node of an extensive
form game (Kreps and Wilson, 1982).2
A game form endows players with finite strategy sets and specifies
which is the outcome that arises from each pure strategy profile.3 It could
identify, for instance, two ending nodes in an extensive game form with the
same outcome. Govindan and McLennan (2001) give an example of a game
form such that, in an open set of utilities over outcomes, produces infinitely
many equilibrium distributions on outcomes. In view of such a negative re-
sult, we have to turn to specific classes of games to seek for positive results
regarding the generic determinacy of the Nash equilibrium concept. For
1By outcomes we mean the set of physical or economic outcomes of the game (i.e. the
set of different economic alternatives that can be found after the game is played) and not
the set of probability distribution induced by equilibria. We will refer to the latter concept
as the set of equilibrium distributions.
2Harsanyi (1973) actually proves that the set of Nash equilibria is finite for a generic
assignment of payoffs to pure strategy profiles.
3More generally, it specifies a probability distribution on the set of outcomes. Game
forms are formally defined in Section 4.2.2
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some examples, see Park (1997) for sender-receiver games, and De Sinop-
oli (2001), De Sinopoli and Iannantuoni (2005) for voting games.
This paper studies the generic determinacy of the Nash equilibrium con-
cept when individual payoffs depend on the network connecting them. The
network literature has been fruitful to describe social and economic inter-
action. See for instance Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), Jackson and Watts
(2002), Kranton and Minehart (2001), or Calvo-Armengol (2004). It is,
therefore, important to have theories about how such networks form. Dif-
ferent network formation procedures have been proposed. For a compre-
hensive survey of those theories the reader is referred to Jackson (2003).
The current paper is concerned with a noncooperative approach to net-
work formation. We focus on the network formation game proposed by
Myerson (1991). It can be described as follows: each player simultaneously
proposes a list of players with whom she wants to form a link, and a direct
link between two players is formed if and only if both players agree on that.
This game is simple and intuitive, however, since it takes two players to
form a link, a coordination problem arises which makes the game exhibit
multiplicity of equilibria. Nevertheless, we can prove that even though a
network formation game may have a large number of equilibria, every prob-
ability distribution on networks induced by equilibria is generically isolated.
The network formation game is formally presented in the next section.
Section 4.3 discusses an example. Section 4.4 contains the main result and
its proof. To conclude, Section 4.5 discusses some extensions of the result
to other network formation games as well as a related result for the exten-
sive form game of network formation introduced by Aumann and Myerson
(1989).
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4.2. Preliminaries
Given a finite set A, denote as P (A) the power set of A, and as ∆(A) the
set of probability distributions on A.
4.2.1. Networks. Given a set of players N, a network g is a collection
of direct links. A direct link in the network g between two different players
i and j is denoted by i j ∈ g. For the time being we focus on undirected
networks. In an undirected network i j ∈ g is equivalent to ji ∈ g.4 The set
of i’s direct links in g is Li(g) = { jk ∈ g : j = i or k = i}.
The complete network gN is such that Li(gN) = {i j : j 6= i}, for all i ∈
N. In gN player i is directly linked to every other player. The set of all
undirected networks on N is G = P (gN).
Each player i can be directly linked with N−1 other players. The num-
ber of links in the complete network gN is N(N−1)/2, dividing by 2 not to
count links twice. Since G is the power set of gN , it has 2N(N−1)/2 elements.
4.2.2. Game forms. A game form is given by a set of players N =
{1, . . . ,n}, nonempty finite sets of pure strategies S1, . . . ,Sn, a finite set of
outcomes Ω, a function θ : S→∆(Ω), and utilities defined over the outcome
space Ω, that is, u1, . . . ,un : Ω → R. Once we fix N, S1, . . . ,Sn, Ω, and θ, a
game form is given by a point in
(
RΩ
)N
.
Utility functions u1, . . . ,un over Ω induce utility functions v1, . . . ,vn
over S according to u1 ◦ θ, . . . ,un ◦ θ. Hence, every game form has asso-
ciated its finite normal form game.
4.2.3. The Network Formation Game. The following network for-
mation game is due to Myerson (1991). The set of players is N. All players
4In a directed network, if i and j are two different agents, the link i j is different from
the link ji. This two links can be regarded as different if, for instance, they explain which
is the direction of information, or which is the player who is sponsoring the link.
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in N simultaneously announce the set of direct links they wish to form. For-
mally, the set of player i’s pure strategies is Si = P (N \ {i}). Therefore, a
strategy si ∈ Si is a subset of N \{i} and is interpreted as the set of players
other than i with whom player i wishes to form a link. Mutual consent is
needed to create a direct link, i.e., if s is played, i j is created if and only if
j ∈ si and i ∈ s j.
We can adapt the previous general description of game forms to the
present context in order to specify the game form that structures the net-
work formation game. Let the set of players and the collection of pure
strategy sets be as above. The set of outcomes is the set of undirected net-
works, i.e., Ω = G . The function θ is a deterministic outcome function,
formally, θ : S → G . Given a pure strategy profile, θ specifies which net-
work is formed respecting the rule of mutual consent to create direct links.
Utilities are functions u1, . . . ,un : G →R. Once the set of players N is given,
the pure strategy sets are automatically created and the network formation
game is defined by a point in
(
RG
)N
.
If players other than i play according to s−i ∈ S−i,5 the utility to player
i from playing strategy si is equal to vi(si,s−i) = ui(θ(si,s−i)).
Let Σi =∆(Si) be the set of mixed strategies of player i. Furthermore, let
Σ = Σ1×·· ·×Σn. While a pure strategy profile s results in the network θ(s)
with certainty, a mixed strategy profile σ generates a probability distribution
on G , where the probability that g ∈ G forms equals
P(g | σ) = ∑
s∈θ−1(g)
(
∏
i∈N
σi(si)
)
.
5S−i = ∏ j 6=i S j.
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If players other than i play according to σ−i in Σ−i,6 the utility to
player i from playing the mixed strategy σi is equal to Vi(σi,σ−i) =
∑g∈G P(g | (σi,σ−i))ui(g).
DEFINITION 4.1 (Nash Equilibrium). The strategy profile σ ∈ Σ is a
Nash equilibrium of the network formation game if Vi(σi,σ−i)≥Vi(σ′i,σ−i)
for all σ′i in Σi, and for all i in N.
4.2.4. Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Distributions. Let us first
give the definition of a generic set.
DEFINITION 4.2. For any m ≥ 0, we say that G ⊂ Rm is a generic set,
or generic, if Rm \ int(G) has Lebesgue measure 0.
Govindan and McLennan (2001) give an example of a game form that,
in an open set of utilities over outcomes, produces infinitely many equilib-
rium distributions on the outcome space.7 Nevertheless, they also provide
a number of positive results. Consider the general specification of game
forms given in Section 4.2.2. The following theorem is a slight modifica-
tion of Theorem 5.3 in Govindan and McLennan (2001).
THEOREM 4.1. If θ is such that at all completely mixed strategy tuples
and for each agent i the set of distributions on Ω that agent i can induce
by changing her strategy is (|Si|−1)-dimensional, then for generic utilities
there are finitely many completely mixed equilibria.
The proof of Theorem 4.1 is offered in the appendix.
6Σ−i = ∏ j 6=i Σ j.
7Their counterexample needs at least three players. In a recent paper, Kukushkin et al.
(2007) provide a counterexample for the two player case.
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4.3. An Example
Consider a 3 person network formation game. The corresponding game
form is depicted in Figure 4.1. Player 1 is the row player, player 2 the
column player, and player 3 the matrix player. The symbol g0 denotes the
empty network, gN denotes the complete network, gi j denotes the network
that only contains link i j, and gi denotes the network where player i is
connected to every other player and such that there are no further links.8
{ /0} {1} {3} {1,3} { /0} {1} {3} {1,3}
{ /0} g0 g0 g0 g0 g0 g0 g0 g0
{2} g0 g12 g0 g12 g0 g12 g0 g12
{3} g0 g0 g0 g0 g13 g13 g13 g13
{2,3} g0 g12 g0 g12 g13 g1 g13 g1
{ /0} {1}
{ /0} g0 g0 g23 g23 g0 g0 g23 g23
{2} g0 g12 g23 g2 g0 g12 g23 g2
{3} g0 g0 g23 g23 g13 g13 g3 g3
{2,3} g0 g12 g23 g2 g13 g1 g3 gN
{2} {1,2}
FIGURE 4.1. The game form of a network formation game
with three players.
Suppose that the utility function of player i = 1,2 is ui(g) = |Li(g)|,
i.e. player i = 1,2 derives an utility from network g equal to the number of
direct links that she maintains in g. Suppose also that player 3 has the same
utility as players 1 and 2, except that she derives an utility equal to 2 from
8This network architecture is often referred to as a star, see Bala and Goyal (2000)
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network g2. Speciffically,
ui(g0) = 0 for all i,
ui(g jk) =

1 if i = k or i = j
0 otherwise,
ui(g j) =

2 if i = j
2 if i = 3 and j = 2
1 otherwise,
gi(gN) = 2 for all i.
Figure 4.2 displays the set of Nash equilibria of this game. The subset
of Nash equilibria of line (i) supports the empty network, the subsets of line
(ii) support, respectively, networks g12, g13 and g23, the subsets of line (iii)
support, respectively, networks g1, g2 and g3.
NE =
{
({ /0},{ /0},{ /0})
}⋃(i)
{
({2},{1},{ /0})
}⋃{
({3},{ /0},{1})
}⋃{
({ /0},{3},{2})
}⋃(ii)
{
({2,3},{1},{1})
}⋃{
({2},{1,3},{2})
}⋃{
({3},{3},{1,2})
}⋃(iii)
{
({2,3},{1,3},λ{2}+(1−λ){1,2}) : λ ∈ [0,1]
}
.
(iv)
FIGURE 4.2. Set of Nash equilibria of the 3 person network
formation game discussed in Section 4.3.
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The subset of equilibria of line (iv) induces a continuum of probability
distribution over the set of networks that give probability λ to network g2and
probability (1−λ) to the complete network gN for λ ∈ [0,1].
Now perturb independently the utility that each player obtains from each
network. The subsets of strategy profiles of lines (i) through (iii) are still
equilibrium strategy profiles. In addition, there are two possibilities:
• Player 3 ranks the complete network gN over network g2. In this
case the set of Nash equilibria is composed of lines (i) through (iii)
united to {
({2,3},{1,3},{1,2})
}
,
which supports the complete network.
• Player 3 ranks network g2 over the complet nerwork gN . Then, no
Nash equilibrium gives positive probability to the complete net-
work. The set of Nash equilibria is composed of lines (i) through
(iii) united to{
(λ{2}+(1−λ){2,3},{1,3},{2}) : λ ∈ [0,1)
}
,
which supports network g2.
In either case, there is a finite number of probability distributions on
networks induced by equilibria.
4.4. The Result
PROPOSITION 4.1. For generic u ∈ (RG )N the set of probability distri-
butions on networks induced by Nash equilibria of the network formation
game is finite.
PROOF. Given a network formation game, there are a finite number of
different normal form games obtained by assigning to each player i an ele-
ment of P (Si) as her strategy set.
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Let T = T1 × ·· · × Tn, where Ti ⊆ Si. The normal form game ΓT is
defined by the set of players N, the collection of strategy sets {Ti}i∈N , and
the collection of utility functions {vTi }i∈N , where vTi is the restriction of vi
to T . Furthermore, let GT = θ(T ).
It is enough to prove that for a generic assignment of payoffs to net-
works, completely mixed Nash equilibria of each of those games induce a
finite set of probability distributions on G . Notice that every equilibrium of
any game can be obtained as a completely mixed equilibrium of the modi-
fied game obtained by eliminating unused strategies.
Consider the game ΓT . If there exists a strategy ti ∈ Ti with j ∈ ti and
there does not exist a strategy t j ∈ Tj such that i ∈ t j, replace strategy ti with
t ′i = ti \{ j} in case t ′i is not already contained in Ti, otherwise just eliminate
strategy ti from Ti. Notice that by making this change, the set of probability
distributions on GT that can be obtained through mixed strategies remains
unaltered. Most importantly, for every completely mixed Nash equilibrium
of ΓT , there exists a completely mixed Nash equilibrium of the modified
game that induces the same probability distribution on GT .
Repeat the same procedure with t ′i : if there exists a k ∈ t ′i and there does
not exist a strategy tk in Tk with i ∈ tk substitute t ′i for t ′′i = t ′i \ {k} in case
t ′′i is not already contained in Tk. Continue eliminating and replacing pure
strategies in the same vein, for every ti in Ti and for every i in N, until every
link proposal that any player has in some on her strategies is formed with
positive probability under a completely mixed strategy profile. Let ˆT denote
the resulting set of pure strategy profiles, and notice that G
ˆT = GT .
At every completely mixed strategy profile σ of Γ
ˆT , every network in
GT receives positive probability. At the strategy profile (ti,σ−i), only those
networks g ∈ GT such that {i j : j ∈ ti} ⊂ g receive positive probability, and
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since for every player i each of her pure strategies is different, we have that:
rank ∂P∂σi
(· | σ) = | ˆTi|−1.
Therefore, at every completely mixed strategy profile of Γ
ˆT the set prob-
ability distributions on GT that player i can induce by varying her strategy is
(| ˆTi|−1)-dimensional. We can apply Theorem 4.1 to the game form given
by ˆT and θ
ˆT , the restriction of θ to ˆT . This implies that for generic utilities
over GT there are finitely many completely mixed equilibria of Γ ˆT , which
in turn implies that the set of probability distributions on GT induced by
completely mixed Nash equilibria of ΓT is generically finite.
Let T ⊆ S, we can write (RG )N = (RGT )N ×(RG \GT)N . Let K be a
closed set of zero measure in
(
RGT
)N
, i.e., the closure of the set of payoffs
over GT such that the set of completely mixed Nash equilibria of ΓT induces
infinitely many probability distributions on GT , then for any closed set H in(
RG \GT
)N
the closed set K×H has zero measure in (RG )N . The same is
true for any other T ′ ⊆ S. This concludes the proof. 
4.5. Remarks
4.5.1. Absence of Mutual Consent. Models of network formation can
be found in the literature that do not require common agreement between
the parties to create a direct link, see for instance Bala and Goyal (2000).
Thus, suppose that mutual consent is not needed to create a direct link. Let
N be the set of players, let S1, . . . ,Sn be the collection of pure strategy sets,
where Si = P (N \{i}) for all i in N, and let G be the outcome space. In the
model analyzed in Section 4.4, a link may not be created even if a player
wants it to be created. In the current model, a link may be created even if a
player does not want it to be created.
In this modified network formation game, generically, the set of equi-
librium distributions on G is also finite. Notice that we can reinterpret pure
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strategies si ∈ Si as the set of players other that i with whom player i does
not want to form a link. The link i j is not created only if player i does not
want to be linked with player j and player j does not want to be linked with
player i. Define θ′ : S → G according to θ′(s) = gN \ θ(s), where θ is the
one defined in Section 4.2.3. Now, apply the proof of Section 4.4.
4.5.2. Directed Networks. Sometimes links i j and ji cannot be treated
as equivalent for reasons coming from the nature of the phenomena being
modeled. Directed networks respond to this necessity, for an example see
again Bala and Goyal (2000). Denote the set of directed networks as G d .
Suppose first that link formation does not need mutual consent. The strategy
set of player i is Si = P (N \{i}). A strategy si ∈ Si is interpreted as the set
of players other than i with whom player i wants to start an arrowhead link
pointing at herself, i.e. the set of links that player i wishes to receive.9
Notice that each pure strategy profile leads to a different element in
G d: each player has 2N−1 pure strategies, and there are 2N(N−1) undirected
networks. Therefore, we are in the case of normal form payoffs where the
generic finiteness of equilibria is guaranteed.
Suppose now that if a player i wants to receive a link from player j,
player j needs to declare that she wants to send a link to player i for it
to be created. To accommodate for this case, let the strategy set of player
i be Si = Sri × Ssi = P (N \ {i})× P (N \ {i}). A strategy si ∈ Si has two
components, sri and ssi . We interpret sri as the set of players other than i
from whom player i wishes to receive a link, and ssi as the set of players
other than i to whom player i wishes to send a link. Suppose that the pure
strategy profile s is played. The link i j is created only if j ∈ sri and i ∈ ssj.
9We can assume, for instance, that the arrowhead tells which is the direction of the
flow of information.
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A similar proof to the one used in Section 4.4 establishes the generic
determinacy of the Nash equilibrium concept under this setting. The key
step that we must change is the following: Let T = T1 × ·· · × Tn where
Ti ⊂ Si for all i. Consider the normal form game ΓT . If there exists a
strategy ti ∈ Ti such that j ∈ tri (such that j ∈ tsi ) and there does not exist
a strategy t j ∈ Tj such that i ∈ tsj (such that i ∈ trj), replace strategy ti with
t ′i = (tri \{ j}, tsi ) (with t ′i = (tri , tsi \{ j})). Finally, repeat the same procedure
for every ti, t ′i , . . . and for every i until the hypothesis of Theorem 4.1 holds.
4.5.3. A Extensive Form Game of Network Formation. We have fo-
cused on normal form games of network formation. However, there ex-
ists a prominent extensive game of network formation due to Aumann and
Myerson (1989). They proposed the first explicit formalization of network
formation as a game. It relies on an exogenously given order over possible
links. Let (i1 j1, . . . , im jm) be such a ranking.
The game has m stages. In the first stage players i1 and j1 play a simul-
taneous move game to decide whether or not they form link i1 j1. Each of
them chooses an action from the set {yes,not}. The link i1 j1 is established
if and only if both players choose yes. Once the decision on link i1 j1 is
taken, every player gets informed about it, and the play of the game moves
to the decision about link i2 j2. The game evolves in the same fashion, and
finishes with the stage where players im and jm decide upon link im jm.10
The resulting network is formed by the set links ik jk such that both play-
ers ik and jk chose yes at stage k. Although in the argument we work with
10If players get informed about which has been the terminal position in the simulta-
neous move game of every stage, the same argument offered below also goes through.
Several features can be added to this basic model. For instance, two players can be
called to reconsider their decision in case some set of links is formed, or two player may
not be allowed to decide upon the link connecting them. At this respect, if players are
forming an undirected network, m can be different from 2
N(N−1)
2 .
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undirected networks, the game can be applied to the formation of directed
networks.
The argument that follows is a modification of the one used by Govindan
and McLennan (2001) to prove that, for a given assignment of outcomes to
ending nodes in an extensive game of perfect information, and for utilities
such that no player is indifferent between two different outcomes, every
Nash equilibrium induces a degenerate probability distribution in the set of
outcomes. Such an argument is, in turn, a generalization of the one used by
Kuhn (1953) to prove his “backwards induction” theorem that characterizes
subgame perfect equilibria for games of perfect information.
Consider the generic set of utilities
UG =
{
u ∈
(
RG
)N
: ui(g1) 6= ui(g2) for all i ∈ N and all g1,g2 ∈ G
}
.
The claim is that if the utility vector is u ∈UG, every Nash equilibrium
induces a probability distribution on G that assigns probability one to some
g ∈ G .
Let Si denote the set of pure strategies of player i, where now a pure
strategy is a function that assigns one element of {yes,not} to each infor-
mation set of player i. As usual, Σi = ∆(Si) and Σ = Σ1×·· ·×Σn.
Let σ ∈ Σ be a Nash equilibrium for u ∈UG. The appropriate modifica-
tion of σ, say σ¯, is a completely mixed Nash equilibrium of the extensive
form game obtained by eliminating all information sets and branches that
occur with zero probability in case σ is played. In this reduced game, ev-
ery information set has a well defined conditional probability over networks
and, obviously, σ¯ induces the same probability distribution on G as σ.
If there is a stage where a player randomizes between yes and not and
the other player chooses yes with positive probability, there must be a last
such stage. But at this last stage, say ih jh, such an agent, say ih, cannot be
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optimizing, since she is not indifferent between g\{ih jh} and g∪{ih jh} for
any g ∈ G .
We can adapt the previous argument to the case where mutual consent is
not needed to create a link. Let (i1 j1, . . . , im jm) be an oder of links. At stage
k, player ik decides whether or not to create link ik jk. Her decision becomes
publicly known. It is, consequently, a game of perfect information and the
argument given by Govindan and McLennan (2001) covers this case.
4.6. Appendix: Proof of Theorem 4.1
The current proof is based on the one offered by Govindan and McLen-
nan (2001). It uses some concepts and results of semi-algebraic theory that
we will now revise. Expositions of semi-algebraic geometry in the eco-
nomic literature occur in Blume and Zame (1994), Schanuel et al. (1991)
and Govindan and McLennan (2001). Proofs of major results are omitted.
DEFINITION 4.3. A set A is semi-algebraic if it is the finite union of
sets of the form
{x ∈ Rm : P(x) = 0 and Q1(x)> 0 and. . . and Qk(x)> 0}
where P and Q1, . . . ,Qk are polynomials in x1, . . . ,xm with real coefficients.
A function (or correspondence) g : A → B with semi-algebraic domain A ⊂
Rn and range B⊂Rm is semi-algebraic if its graph is a semi-algebraic subset
of Rn+m.
Each semi-algebraic set is the finite union of connected components.
Each component is a semi-algebraic manifold of a given dimension. A d-
dimensional semi-algebraic manifold in Rm is a semi-algebraic set M ⊂Rm
such that for each p ∈ M there exist polynomials P1, . . . ,Pm−d and U , a
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neighborhood of p, such that DP1(p), . . . ,DPm−d(p) are linearly indepen-
dent and
M∩U = {q ∈U : P1(q) = . . .= Pm−d(q) = 0} .
THEOREM 4.2 (Stratification, Whitney (1957)). If A is a semi-algebraic
set, then A is the union of a finite number of disjoint, connected semi-
algebraic manifolds A j with A j ⊂ cl(Ak) whenever A j∩ cl(Ak) 6= /0.
Henceforth, the superscript of a set indexes components of a decompo-
sition as per Theorem 4.2, while a subscript keeps indexing strategy sets by
players. Theorem 4.2 has important consequences. Among those, we will
use the following intuitive ones: Let A⊂Rm and B ⊂Rn be semi-algebraic
sets, then
• the dimension of A, dimA, is equal to the largest dimension of any
element of any stratification,
• if A is 0-dimensional then A is finite,
• A is generic if and only if dim(Rm \A)< m,
• dim(A×B) = dimA+dimB.
We need one additional result. While Theorem 4.2 decomposes semi-
algebraic sets, the following one decomposes semi-algebraic functions.
THEOREM 4.3 (Generic Local Triviality, Hardt (1980)). Let A and B
be semi algebraic sets, and let g : A → B be a continuous semi-algebraic
function. Then there is a relatively closed semi-algebraic set B′ ⊂ B with
dimB′ < dimB such that each component B j of B \ B′ has the following
property: there is a semi algebraic set F j and a semi-algebraic homeomor-
phism h : B j ×F j → A j, where A j = g−1(B j), with g(h(b, f )) = b for all
(b, f ) ∈ B j×F j.
We can now proceed to prove Theorem 4.1. Recall that at every
completely mixed strategy σ ∈ Σ, the set of probability distributions on
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outcomes that player i can induce by varying her strategy is (|Si|−1)-
dimensional.
PROOF OF THEOREM 4.1. Let
A = {(σ,u) : σ is a completely mixed equilibrium for u} .
Let piΣ be the projection of A onto Σ. Apply Theorem 4.3 to piΣ and choose
Σ j such that dimA j = dimA.11 We have that dimA = dimΣ j + dimF j ≤
dimΣ+dimF j. Let σ belong to Σ j, then dimpi−1Σ (σ) = dim{σ}+dimF j =
dimF j. Now consider a given u, the set
{u˜i ∈Ui : σ is a completely mixed equilibrium for (u˜i,u−i)}
is (dimUi − (|Si| − 1))-dimensional. Consequently, the dimension of
pi−1Σ (σ) and F j is equal to dimU−dimΣ, which implies that dimA≤ dimU .
Now apply Theorem 4.3 to piU , the projection of A onto U . Choose U j
to be of the same dimension as U . Therefore, dimA j = dimU +dimpi−1U (u).
This implies that dimpi−1U (u)≤ dimA−dimU ≤ 0, i.e. there is a finite set of
completely mixed equilibria whenever u belongs to a full dimensional U j.
This concludes the proof since lower dimensional U j’s are nongeneric. 
11Such a Σ j can be found because we can keep applying Theorem 4.3 to piΣ :
pi−1Σ (Σ′)→ Σ′, where Σ′ plays the role of B′.
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